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"State inaction towards cases of violence against women fosters an
environment of impunity andpromotes the repetition of violence 'since
society sees no evidence of willingness by the State, as the representative of
the society, to take effective action to sanction such acts.
INTRODUCTION

With its recent decision in Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States,
Abraham L. Freedman Fellow, Temple University Beasley School of Law; B.S.F.S.,
Georgetown University; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. As I seem to do in
all my articles, I thank Robin West, this time along with Jane Aiken, for the
conversation that planted the first seeds of this article and the larger project that it
begins. I also thank the many colleagues who commented upon earlier versions of the
article at the Mid-Atlantic Clinical Workshop, the 2011 and 2012 Georgetown Law
Summer Workshops, and in subsequent conversations, with particular thanks to Phyllis
Goldfarb, Leigh Goodmark, Laurie Kohn, Lisa Vollendorf Martin, Amy Myers,
Victoria Nourse, Catherine Powell, Jodi Short, David Super, and Michael Van Alstine.
Finally, my thanks go to Rick Greenstein for his thoughts, feedback and edits on this
project in its many stages, from when it mainly existed in my head to the last readthrough of the semi-final draft.
1. Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
80/11, T 168 (2011) (quoting Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L.V.II.111 doc. 20 rev.
56 (2001),
available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/women/Brazil12.051.htm).
*
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the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights further developed a
theory of "collective entity responsibility" for violence against women and
gender-based violence.2 In Lenahan, a domestic violence survivor, Jessica
Lenahan (then Jessica Gonzales), held a civil protection order that directed
police to arrest her husband if he violated its terms. When Mr. Gonzales
kidnapped his three daughters one night, the police refused to enforce the
civil protection order, despite Ms. Lenahan's frequent and increasingly
urgent pleas for their help. Mr. Gonzales eventually opened fire on the
2. A note about language: this article uses "violence against women" and "genderbased violence" interchangeably.
The term 'gender-based violence' refers to violence that targets individuals or
groups on the basis of their gender. The United Nations' Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights' Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) defines it as 'violence that is
directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women
disproportionately,' in its General Recommendation 19.... This does not
mean that all acts against a woman are gender-based violence, or that all
victims of gender-based violence are female. The surrounding circumstances
where men are victims of sexual violence could include men being harassed,
beaten or killed because they do not conform to views of masculinity, which
are accepted by the society.
Gender-Based

Violence,

INTEGRATED

REGIONAL

INFO.

NETWORKS,

http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthld=20&Reportld=62847
(last
visited March 5, 2012).
In addition, other than when I am discussing studies or other sources that use terms
such as "sexual assault" or "rape," I use "sexual violence" instead of those terms
because, in my view, "sexual violence" is a broader, more descriptive term that is not a
term of art-one which I regard as including a wider range of actions that may not fit
certain general or legal definitions of "sexual assault" or "rape." The term therefore
includes "sexual assault" or "rape," as well as other actions involving physical contact
of a sexual nature (while I acknowledge that non-physical actions can constitute
violence, including those forms of violence is beyond the scope of this article). When I
am discussing studies or other sources that use terms such as "sexual assault" or "rape,"
I retain use of those terms as the original researchers and authors used them.
Similarly, my definition of "report" and "reporting" is not a technical one. I regard a
report as any time a victim discloses the violence to any professional with any role or
authority to help victims. These professionals include, but are not limited to, medical
professionals, counselors, security or conduct-related officials, residential life or other
student affairs personnel, as well as faculty, campus, or community advocates.
In addition, I use "victim" and "survivor" interchangeably to refer to people who say
that they have been victims of sexual violence. Therefore, "victim" is again not a term
of art used to indicate a finding of responsibility for sexual violence. I use
"perpetrator" or "assailant" when someone accused of sexual violence has been found
responsible or in discussions where it can be assumed the person perpetrated the sexual
violence, such as statistical analyses. I use "accused" or "alleged" to indicate when I
am referring to those who have been charged but not found responsible for committing
sexual violence and "accuser" when discussing the role of the victim/survivor in a
disciplinary proceeding. Because studies confirm that the majority of victims are
women and the majority of perpetrators and accused perpetrators are men, I use female
pronouns to refer to victims and male pronouns to refer to perpetrators and accused
perpetrators.
Finally, I use "school" and "institution" to identify either K-12 schools or higher
education institutions, although I also use "college," "university," ".campus,"or "higher
education" to refer to the latter category of schools.
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police station and was shot and killed by police when they returned his fire.
Ms. Lenahan's three daughters were later found shot to death in his truck
and a variety of police actions and inactions surrounding the daughters'
death cast suspicion on whether the daughters were shot by Mr. Gonzales
or by police during the gunfight at the police station. Ms. Lenahan sued the
police department for violations of her due process rights under the U.S.
Constitution. Although the U.S. Supreme Court denied her claim, saying
that she had no due process right to enforcement of a civil protection order,
Ms. Lenahan prevailed in her complaint against the U.S. in front of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission), which found
the U.S. in violation of its international obligations under the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the Charter of the
Organization of American States. In deciding the case, the Commission
used the theory of "State responsibility" for domestic violence, which had
its origins in the Inter-American human rights system's requirement that
States prevent, investigate, sanction, and provide remedies for violence
against women.4
Because, as the opening quote suggests, the State represents society, the
State is a collective entity. Collective entities are entities that are treated
like a single entity or actor by the law and are generally viewed as a unitary
entity by actual individuals.
Nevertheless, collective entities are not
individual persons themselves-they are made up of and/or represent a
group of individuals, although "representation" in this context does not
have a specific definition.
In addition, the opening quote also articulates that the State's actions and
inactions are linked to the actions or inactions of individual actors.
Because the State represents society, its actions and inactions are often
assumed to express a society's normative views about a particular issue.
The State's actions and inactions therefore send a message back to society
as a whole about the "rightness" or "wrongness" of the actions or inactions
of individual members of society. This message then encourages or
discourages the individual actions or inactions that are addressed by that
particular exercise of the State's expressive function. Because of this link
between the State's normative powers and the actions or inactions of
individuals, the theory goes, the State has a responsibility to act or not act
in such a way that will encourage or discourage certain individual actions
or inactions, including those affecting other individuals.
Moreover, as the opening quote further indicates, with regard to violence
against women, States tend to be inactive. They either do not seek, or
3. Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11,

2, 4, 5, 90.

4. See id. TT 43, 116, 120, 122.
5. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944).
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inadequately seek, to prevent, investigate, sanction, and provide remedies
for gender-based violence committed by non-State actors against other
individuals. 6 This State inaction undercuts the message that gender-based
violence is wrong, even when a State expresses such a normative principle
through its laws, because the State has failed to back up that expression
with enforcement of those laws. Thus, the State creates an "environment of
impunity," where non-State actors continue to commit gender-based
violence because they have not been sanctioned for previous acts of
violence and thus have experienced neither normative nor practical
deterrence of later violent acts.
At first glance, this theory of State responsibility for gender-based
violence seems diametrically opposed to the attitude of U.S. law to genderbased violence. In fact, nothing demonstrates that difference more than
comparing the Commission's decision in Lenahan with the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision on the same facts, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales.'
Besides this particular case, efforts to get U.S. local, state, and federal
governments to combat violence against women adequately have generally
U.S. jurisprudence-particularly
met with barrier after barrier.
constitutional jurisprudence on State action, due process, equal protection,
even the commerce clause-appears opposed to the Inter-American
system's theory of State responsibility for violence against women.
While the differences are prominent when one compares the theory in
Lenahan only with U.S. jurisprudence involving the State, focusing upon
the State responsibility theory as a theory of collective entity responsibility
demonstrates that U.S. law does have an analogue to State responsibility
for gender-based violence: "hostile environment" sexual harassment
theory. Hostile environment sexual harassment theory holds employers
and schools responsible for sex discrimination when they fail to respond
adequately to gender-based violence (considered a severe form of sexual
harassment) directed at their employees or students.8 Fundamental to the
hostile environment sexual harassment liability scheme is the idea that,
although the employer or school is not directly harassing the victim, the
employer or school is liable if it has failed to protect the victim from such
harassment by employees, students, or other third parties who are peers to
the victim in the workplace or school hierarchy. 9 Since employers and
6. Cf Brief for New York Legal Assistance Grp. et. al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 6, 8-9, Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11.
7. Compare Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (Gonzales IV), 545 U.S. 748, 768
(2005), with Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, f 90, 91, 196-97, 199.
8. See Heather Shana Bancheck, Overcoming a Hostile Work Environment:
Recognizing School District Liability for Student-on-Teacher Sexual Harassment
Under Title VII and Title IX, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 577, 586-88 (2007).
9. See id. at 596-97.
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schools are collective entities both in law and in fact, hostile environment
sexual harassment theory is also a theory of collective responsibility for
gender-based violence.' 0
Furthermore, both the State responsibility and hostile environment
sexual harassment theories are based in legal prohibitions against sex
discrimination. A State's failure to prevent, investigate, sanction, and
provide remedies for violence against women is not a general failure with
regard to all forms of violence. Rather, when the State's failure is not
generalized but only happens with violence that disparately impacts
women, the State's inaction is discriminatory on the basis of sex.
Similarly, hostile environment sexual harassment theory is based in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and Title IX of the
Educational Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), both of which prohibit sex
discrimination: Title VII by employers, and Title IX by schools that receive
federal funding."
These collective entity responsibility theories also share similar
conceptions of the causes, consequences, and complicating factors involved
in gender-based violence-conceptions that are linked to the general
similarities, including the concern with inaction on the part of collective
entities, and the basis of the State and school responsibility theories in
equal protection law. Moreover, these conceptions are confirmed both by
sociological research on gender-based violence and by more detailed
doctrinal similarities between the two theories.
One emerging set of relevant sociological theories suggests that the legal
approaches encouraged by the collective entity responsibility theories of
State responsibility and hostile environment sexual harassment are more
likely to address and ultimately prevent gender-based violence. This
scholarship shows that gender-based violence is enabled by a cycle of
violence and non-reporting of the violence, as well as what one sociologist
calls a "culture of silence and a culture of protection." 12 That is, a
relatively small number of individual violent perpetrators are protected by
the many "silent bystanders" who are aware of the violence, but do not
report, intervene, or otherwise seek to stop it. Because victims often do not
want to (or are not in a position to) report those who perpetrated violence
against them, and because the bystanders remain silent, the violent
10. Note that employers of a very small size-such as individuals who are sole

owners of a business-may not be considered collective entities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(2006) (defining an employer as having fifteen or more employees). However, schools
are always collective entities according to the conception of collective entities outlined
above. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (2006).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
12. MICHAEL KIMMEL, GUYLAND: THE PERILOUS WORLD WHERE BOYS BECOME
MEN 59 (2008).
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behavior of the small number of repeat perpetrators is implicitly supported.
Those perpetrators are not deterred from perpetrating in the future, and thus
the cycle of violence continues. Castle Rock v. Gonzales demonstrates the
dynamics of bystander inaction surrounding gender-based violence, and the
connections between this bystander culture and collective entity inaction.
In contrast, the Lenahan and U.S. hostile environment sexual harassment
cases are designed to prompt bystander intervention through holding the
chief bystander-the State or the school-responsible for inaction. 3 The
combined impact of these theories thus has the potential to reform legal
regimes, such as U.S. tort and criminal justice systems, in a direction more
likely to stop this cycle of violence.
Therefore, this Article explores the implications of Lenahan in the
context of a broader project considering how theories of collective entity
responsibility for gender-based violence might be integrated into other
parts of the U.S. legal system in ways that can improve our response to and
prevent such violence. The project will first consider U.S. common law
tort regimes, then move on to the U.S. criminal justice system. It will
employ the collective entity responsibility theories used in Lenahan and its
predecessor international law cases, as well as in U.S. hostile environment
sexual harassment jurisprudence, to discuss and suggest potential
improvements to these other domestic law regimes. As the first in a series
of articles developing various parts of this broader project, this Article will
compare the commonalities between the State responsibility and hostile
environment sexual harassment theories as examples of theories of
collective entity responsibility for gender-based violence.
Accordingly, Part I of this Article reviews the development and import
of the State responsibility theory that Lenahan applies to the U.S. Part II
discusses hostile environment sexual harassment jurisprudence dealing
with peer harassment in schools under Title IX. While acknowledging that
hostile environment sexual harassment theory was developed in the context
of Title VII and workplace sexual harassment, this part focuses on a
comparison between State responsibility and "school responsibility" for
several reasons, including because schools function more like the State in
the lives of their students than employers do in the lives of their employees,
and because Title IX jurisprudence includes a large number of cases
involving gender-based violence (as opposed to sexual harassment not
involving physical violence). Part III compares these two lines of
collective entity responsibility jurisprudence. In doing so, Part III pays
13. Compare Gonzales IV, 545 U.S. 748, 773-74, 778 (2005) (holding that law
enforcement's inaction in refusing to enforce Lenahan's civil protection order was not a
legal violation), with Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report No. 80/11, 5 (2011) (concluding that the United States' inaction was a legal
violation).
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particular attention to the goal of preventing gender-based violence that
underlies these theories' focus on encouraging collective entity action, as
well as how both this focus on prevention and these theories' basis in
conceptions of equal protection result in similar doctrinal approaches. This
Part also reviews the sociological evidence regarding the perpetuation of
gender-based violence and demonstrates how the collective school
responsibility and State responsibility theories respond to this evidence of
how the violence actually occurs.
In sum, this Article demonstrates that, because Lenahan has collective
entity responsibility analogues in U.S. domestic law, Lenahan's State
responsibility theory should not be rejected as being irrelevant or
antithetical to U.S. law. This comparison, moreover, shows that whether
the Lenahan decision is binding on the U.S. and the U.S. can be compelled
to enforce it is not ultimately the most important insight of the case.
Rather, because theories of collective responsibility are more likely to
prevent gender-based violence, the State responsibility theory represented
by Lenahan can and should be utilized, as a policy matter and along with
its domestic law analogues, to end the epidemic of gender-based violence
in the U.S. and around the globe.
I. STATE RESPONSIBILITY

The structure of international law has always complicated efforts to hold
Because
States responsible for violating women's human rights.
international law deals with nation-states and their behaviors, relationships,
rights, and obligations vis-A-vis each other, individual human beings were
Although
traditionally excluded from international law's ambit.
international human rights law changed this structure so that individuals
can now complain to international tribunals about State violations of their
rights, protecting women's human rights presented additional difficulties
even under international human rights law. For one thing, there was a
relative absence of provisions in international human rights treaties that
reflect how women experience rights violations. For another, because
international law is the law of States, for a State to have violated an
individual's human rights, the State itself must be responsible in some way
for the violation. While violations of men's human rights are more likely
to occur in the public sphere and more clearly at the hands of the State or
State actors, women's rights are most often violated by non-State actors in
the "private" sphere, making those rights hard-if not impossible-to
redress under the traditional theories and approaches of international law.14

14. See Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist
Approaches to InternationalLaw, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613, 625-27 (1991).
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The best example of this problematic relationship between international
law and women's rights is gender-based violence. Violence against women
is not explicitly named as a violation of women's human rights in any of
the older and most widely adopted international treaties, including the
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
While gender-based violence has been incorporated as a human rights
violation through interpretations," declarations,1 6 and new treaties, 17 these
efforts cannot compensate entirely for the silence regarding it in the older,
more established treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which enjoy more signatories and wider acceptance by the
international community. Under these older treaties, forms of gender-based
violence (such as domestic violence) presented a stark State responsibility
problem: because a domestic violence survivor's human rights are most
often violated by a member of the survivor's family-an individual who is
not being violent at the urging of the State or to fulfill any State purposeit is difficult under traditional intemational law to hold a State responsible
for domestic violence.
However, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights' decision in
Velcisquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras provided an international law rationale
for requiring States to address violence committed by individual actors.' 8
This case held Honduras responsible for violating the American
Convention on Human Rights due to disappearances of citizens suspected
to have been carried out by the Honduras military.19 With only
circumstantial evidence of the military's involvement, the Inter-American
Court held that Honduras was responsible for violating international law
even if it did not directly carry out the disappearances. 20 Because the State
was not taking any action to prevent, investigate, or punish whoever was
15. E.g., Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
11th sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/38; GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1993) [hereinafter
Gen. Rec.
19],
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/
recommendations/recomm.htm#recom 19.
16. E.g., The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A.
Res. 48/104, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/103 (Feb. 23, 1994) [hereinafter DEVAW].
17. E.g., Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American Convention on
the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women: Convention
of Beldm do Pard, 24th Sess., June 6-10, 1994, at 20-21, OAS AG/RES. 1257 (XXIV0/94) (June 9, 1994) [hereinafter Convention of Bel6m do Pard], available at
http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/agres/ag03808E01.pdf; Council of Europe, Convention on
Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, May 11,
2011, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/210.htm.
18. See Veldsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 4,
172-74 (July 29, 1988), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/
docs/casos/articulos/seriec 04 ing.pdf (proclaiming that a State must exercise due
diligence to prevent human rights violations committed by private citizens).
19. Id. TT 185-86.
20. See id. 183, 187.
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carrying out the disappearances, the Inter-American Court said, Honduras
was condoning and encouraging such violence and was indirectly
responsible for it. 2 1
Women's human rights activists took the State obligation to prevent,
investigate, and punish created by Velasquez and combined it with sex
discrimination theory to reach violence by non-State actors such as
domestic violence. Dorothy Thomas and Michele Beasley were two of the
earliest activists to articulate this new approach. In an article entitled
"Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue," they used Veldsquez to
advance a theory under which a State can be held responsible for human
22
Because domestic
rights violations committed by non-State actors.
violence is overwhelmingly directed at women, they said, States commit
sex discrimination in violation of human rights treaties when they fail to
prevent, investigate, and punish domestic violence. By not preventing,
investigating, and punishing crimes committed by individuals, the State is
condoning and encouraging the harm caused by those crimes. Thus, when
the State does not tolerate general lawlessness within its borders, but
condones and encourages particular criminal activity that overwhelmingly
harms one sex, the State's failure to act is discriminatory on the basis of
sex. As a result, Thomas and Beasley argued, domestic violence is a
violation of women's human rights for which States are responsible under
every treaty that prohibits sex discrimination.23
The State responsibility theory explained by Thomas and Beasley
remained a mere theory until courts and international tribunals applied it to
States. Unsurprisingly, given their leadership in Velcisquez, the InterAmerican Commission and Court decided many of the earliest cases
incorporating this theory. Lenahan, in fact, reflects the development of
over 15 years of Inter-American Commission and Court jurisprudence
dealing with violence against women. This jurisprudence began with cases
involving gender-based violence committed under circumstances more
similar to Veldsquez than to Lenahan. For instance, in 1996 the
Commission decided Raquel Marti de Mejia v. Perui, in which a group of

men in military uniforms-likely members of the Peruvian militaryinvaded the home of the Mejia couple, who resided in an area subject to
"emergency legislation" due to suspected "Shining Path" activity, and
abducted the husband.24 One member of the group returned to the home
21. See id. 172, 176, 179-80.
22. See Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Violence as a Human
Rights Issue, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1119, 1125-34 (1995) (asserting that a State can be held
responsible for private persons engaged in gender motivated violence as a violation of
equal protection and discrimination against women).
23. See id. at 1130-34.
24. Mejia v. Peru, Case 10.970, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 5/96, at 1-2
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and raped the wife twice, 2 5 and the husband's body was later found in the
river with evidence of torture. 26 Peru argued that the wife's complaint
regarding the violation of her rights by the sexual violence was a
"repetition" because the Commission had already decided a complaint
brought by the wife regarding the abduction and death of the husband. The
Commission rejected Peru's argument and noted evidence that women like
Mejia, who are "living in areas subject to emergency legislation[,] report
being victims of sexual abuse by soldiers, who generally act with absolute
impunity." 27
Although Mejia was closer in facts to Veldsquez than to Lenahan, within
four years of the Mejia case, the Commission would reach the domestic
violence committed by individual, non-State perpetrators that was
discussed by Thomas and Beasley. In Maria da Penha Maia Fernandesv.
Brazil, the Commission found Brazil in violation of the American
Declaration of Human Rights, American Convention on Human Rights,
and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women (Convention of Bel6m do Pari) 28
for failing to act with due diligence to investigate, prosecute, and punish
the attempted murder of Fernandes by her then-husband some 17 years
prior to the Commission's decision in the case.2 9 In so deciding, the
Commission stated:
The failure to prosecute and convict the perpetrator under these
circumstances is an indication that the State condones the violence
suffered by Maria da Penha . ... Furthermore . .. tolerance by the State

organs is not limited to this case; rather, it is a pattern. The condoning of
this situation by the entire system only serves to perpetuate the
psychological, social, and historical roots and factors that sustain and
encourage violence against women . . . [and] creates a climate that is
conducive to domestic violence ... .30

Thus, in addition to the application of Veldsquez to violence committed
by non-State actors, Maria da Penha also shows the development of the
State responsibility theory. Although the Mejia opinion discussed how the
State's inaction allowed individual perpetrators to commit gender-based
(1996), available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/95eng/Perul0970.htm.
25. Id. at 2.
26. Id. at 3.
27. See id. at 8-11, 13.

28. See Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
3 (2001), available at
No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L.V.II.111 doc. 20 rev.
Brazil
law
(holding
that
http://www.cidh.oas.org/women/Brazill2.051.htm
"encourages an environment of impunity that . .. sends a message that violence against
women is tolerated and accepted as part of daily life").
29. Id. 8, 44.
30. Id. 55-56.

2012]

COLLECTIVE ENTITY RESPONSIBILITY

241

violence with "impunity," Maria da Penha developed that idea into an
articulation of how the State's inaction actually encourages the violence,
rather than just allowing it to occur.
In the next case involving violence against women, Gonzcilez v. Mexico
(In re Cotton Field),3 1 the Inter-American Court linked the "impunity" for
perpetrators and the perpetuation of gender-based violence even more
explicitly. The Cotton Fieldcase involved the disappearances of a 15-yearold girl, a 17-year-old girl, and a 20-year-old woman in Cuidad Juarez-all
of whom were found murdered in a similar fashion in the same cotton
field. 32 They were three out of hundreds or thousands (depending on who
conducted the estimates) of women similarly "disappeared" and/or
murdered in Cuidad Juarez from 1993 until the Inter-American Court's
decision in 2009.33 At several points in the lengthy Cotton Field decision,
the Inter-American Court makes reference to the way in which State
authorities' inadequate response to the murders "propelled the repetition of
the [violence]," 34 and "perpetuat[ed] the violence against women in Ciudad
Juirez."35 The decision ultimately concludes its analysis of Mexico's
failure to act with due diligence by affirming that the State's
"ineffectiveness when dealing with individual cases of violence against
women encourages an environment of impunity that facilitates and
promotes the repetition of acts of violence in general and sends a message
that violence against women is tolerated and accepted as part of daily

life." 36

While lacking as much explanation of the reasons behind its adoption,
other international tribunals have widely adopted and applied the State
responsibility theory, including the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in five cases to date under its
Optional Protocol:37 A. T. v. Hungary,3 8 Sahide Goekce v. Austria,39 Fatma
31. Gonzdlez v. Mexico (In re Cotton Field), Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, 388 (Nov.
16, 2009).
32. Id. 277.
33. Id. T 118-19.

34. Id. 155.
35. Id. 164.
36. Id. 388.

37. See generally Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 54th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4, at 3 (Oct. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Optional Protocol],
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/774/73/PDF/
at
available
N9977473.pdfVOpenElement (agreeing the State has responsibilities to ensure women
can fully enjoy their human rights).
38. See Commc'n No. 2/2003, Ms. A.T. v. Hungary, Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, 32nd Sess. T 9.6, U.N. Doc. A/60/38(Part I) Annex III
(Jan. 26, 2005) [hereinafter A.T.], available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/
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42
Yildirim v. Austria,40 VK. v. Bulgaria,4 and Vertido v. Philippines.
The

CEDAW Optional Protocol cases develop several specific doctrines,
including that States should provide "interim measures" to protect victims,
such as putting a civil protection order option in place and being sensitive
to the possibility of retaliatory violence. In addition, a State should not
delay responding when it "knew or should have known" of serious dangers
to the victim, and may not allow other rights, including those of the
criminal defendant, to "supersede" a victim's rights.43
In A. T. v. Hungary, the author of the complaint had, for four years,
suffered domestic violence at the hands of her common law husband, was
unable to go to a shelter because of her brain-damaged son, and could not
seek a protection order because Hungarian law did not provide for such an
option.4 Under Article 5 of the Optional Protocol, at A.T.'s request,
CEDAW contacted Hungary to ask it to provide "interim measures,5 to
protect her from irreparable harm. 46 The State did not respond to this
request. In judging the complaint admissible, CEDAW decided that the
State had engaged in an "unreasonably prolonged delay" of "over three
cedaw/protocol/decisions-views/CEDAW%20Decision%20on%20AT%20vs%20
Hungary%20English.pdf (holding Hungary responsible for violating the rights of Ms.

A.T.).
39. See Commc'n No. 5/2005, Goekce v. Austria, Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, 39th Sess., July 30-Aug. 10, 2007, TT 12.1.5-12.1.6,
U.N.Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 (August 6, 2007) [hereinafter Goekce], available at
http://www.bayefsky.com/pdf/austria cedaw t5 5 2005.pdf (holding Austria violated
its obligations to uphold Ms. Goekce's rights to eife
and wellness).
40. See Commc'n No. 6/2005, Yildirim v. Austria, Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, 39th Sess., July 30-Aug. 10, 2007,
12.1.5-12.1.6

(October 1, 2007), U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (October 1, 2007) [hereinafter

Yildirim], available at http://www.bayefsky.com/pdf/austria cedaw t5 6 2005.pdf
(holding Austria violated its obligations to uphold Ms. Yildifrm's rights to life and
wellness).
41. See Commc'n No. 20/2008, Ms. V.K. v. Bulgaria, Comm. on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women, 49th Sess., July 11-29, 2011, 9.13, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/49/D/20/2008 (Sept. 27, 2011) [hereinafter V.K.], available at
(holding
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/docs/CEDAW-C-49-D-20-2008_ru.pdf
Bulgaria violated its obligations by not making shelter available to Ms. V.K. and her
children).
42. See Commc'n No. 18/2008, Vertido v. The Philippines, Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 46th Sess., July 12-30, 2010,
8.58.7, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/46D/18/2008 (Sept. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Vertido],
at
http://www.iwraw-ap.org/protocol/doc/
available
KarenTayag Vertido v Philippines.pdf (holding that there should not be an
assumption in a State law or practice that a woman consents to rape by not physically
resisting after being threatened).
43. See A.T., supra note 38,
8.4, 9.3, 9.5; Goekce, supra note 39, $T 12.1.4,
12.1.5; Yildirim, supra note 40, J 12.1.4, 12.1.5; V.K., supra note 41, 19.4.
44. A.T., supra note 38,
45. Id. f 4.1-4.2.

2.1.

46. Optional Protocol, supra note 37, at 4.
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years from the dates of the incidents in question."A7 It also noted that
Hungary had provided no temporary protection to A.T. after criminal
proceedings were instituted, even though her abuser had not been
detained,4 8 implying that the State made A.T. vulnerable to retaliatory
violence from her spouse. Finally, it stated that "[wiomen's human rights
to life and to physical and mental integrity cannot be superseded by other
rights,"4 9 found the State in violation of its treaty obligations,o and made
several recommendations, including that the State make reparations to the
victim. 51
In Yildirim v. Austria and in Goekce v. Austria, the victims were

murdered by their abusive husbands after approximately three months in
the Yildirim case,52 and after three years of escalating death threats and
abuse in the Goekce case. 53 In both cases, CEDAW found Austria in
violation of the treaty because the State "knew or should have known" of
the danger to the victims, 54 and cited A. T. for the premise that "the
perpetrator's rights cannot supersede women's human rights to life and to
physical and mental integrity."55
Finally, in the two most recent CEDAW cases involving gender-based
violence and the State's responsibility to act with due diligence, Vertido v.
Philippines and VK. v. Bulgaria, the two government-defendants already

had laws on the books that should have allowed the States to respond
effectively to gender-based violence.56 However, in both cases, the
enforcement of those laws was lacking due to affirmative refusals to use
those laws by State courts, based on gender stereotypes. In Vertido, the
victim had alleged that she had been raped by a professional colleague,
the case had remained at the trial court level for seven years,58 and then the
court acquitted the defendant based on gender stereotypes about rape

47. A.T., supra note 38,

T 8.4.

48. Id.
49. Id. 9.3.
50. Id. 9.6.
9.6 (stating reparation must be proportionate to the gravity of the
51. See id.
violations infringing the victim's rights).
52. Yildirim, supra note 40, f 2.2-2.13.
2.1-2.11.
53. Goekce, supra note 39,
54. Id. 12.1.4; Yildirim, supra note 40, 12.1.4.

55. Goekee, supra note 39,

12.1.5; Yildirim, supra note 40, 1 12.1.5.

56. See Vertido, supra note 42, 1 8.5; V.K., supra note 41, 1 9.12 (evaluating
judicial precedents and interpretations of laws that are enacted to protect victims).
57. Vertido, supra note 42, 2.2.
58. Id.
8.3-8.4.
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victims. 59 In VK., a victim of domestic violence had been denied a
protection order against her abusive husband, a denial that CEDAW also
judged to be based on gender stereotypes, demonstrated by such actions as
the State court reprimanding the victim for using "insolent language" with
her husband.60 In both cases, CEDAW was careful to specify that it was
not substituting its judgment regarding the facts for those of the State
courts involved, but that it would review the State's policies and
procedures for discrimination. 61 In both cases it also recommended that the
State compensate the victims. 62 In Vertico, it went on to note the delay in
the Philippines' handling of the case and recommended that the State
avoid such delay in future rape cases. 4 In VK., CEDAW once again asked
the State to provide the victim, V.K., with "interim measures" of
protection. It also found the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof
used by Bulgarian courts when deciding domestic violence protection order
cases "excessively high and not in line with the Convention, nor with
current anti-discrimination standards which ease the burden of proof of the
victim in civil proceedings relating to domestic violence complaints."6 5 As
a result, CEDAW recommended that the State change the standard of
proof.66
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has recognized
in multiple gender-based violence cases that the State has a responsibility
to protect individuals against the acts of non-State actors, although it has
not always discussed the theory using the "due diligence" terminology.
Such ECHR cases include Kalucza v. Hungary,6 7 HajduoVi v Slovakia,6 8 A.
v. Croatia,69 Opuz v. Turkey, 70 E.S. & Others v. Slovakia 71 Tomai6 &
59. See id. 8.5 (noting the assessment of the credibility of the victim was
influenced by stereotypes of how the court thought a rape victim should act,

including by accepting the "myth that .. . a woman gives her consent because she
has not physically resisted the unwanted sexual conduct").
60.
61.
62.
63.

V.K., supra note 41, 9.12.
Id. 9.6; Vertido, supra note 42, T8.2.
See V.K., supra note 41, 9.16; Vertido, supra note 42,
Vertido, supra note 42, T 8.3.

8.9.

64. Id. 8.9.

65. V.K., supra note 41,

9.9-9.10.

66. Id. 9.16.

67. Kalucza v. Hungary, App. No. 57693/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110452.
68. Hajduovi v. Slovakia, App. No. 2660/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-101945.
69. A. v. Croatia, App. No. 55164/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-101152.
70. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R (2009), available at

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-92945.
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74
Others v. Croatia, Bevacqua v. Bulgaria,n Kontrova v. Slovakia, and

M C. v. Bulgaria.75 Most of these cases proceed from the premise that
States must "protect the individual against arbitrary action by public
authorities," but they also have "positive obligations [that] may involve the
adoption of measures in the sphere of the relations of individuals between
themselves." 7 6 The standard that the ECHR uses to determine when these
positive obligations kick in is when the State "knew or ought to have
known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk" to the
victim.77 Inactions by the States that violate these obligations include
delays in taking action, the failure to order any interim or protective
measures for the victim, 79 and the failure to enforce orders to detain or treat
the offenders.8o Many of these cases reference a 2002 Recommendation
issued by the Council of Ministers for the European Union,8 1 which
encourages States to take, quickly and without delay,82 a wide range of
specific actions with regard to gender-based violence, including: interim
71. E.S. v. Slovakia, App. No. 8227/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-93955.
72. Tomagid v. Croatia, App. No. 46598/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=002-1695.
73. Bevacqua v. Bulgaria, App. No. 71127/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/bulgaria/BEVACQUA.pdf.
74. Kontrova v. Slovakia, App. No. 7510/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dg2/equality/domesticviolencecampaign/resources/Kontrova%20v
.%20Slovakia en.asp.
75. M.C. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 39272/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47b19f492.html.
76. See Kalucza v. Hungary, App. No. 57693/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. 58-59 (2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110452;
available at
HajduovA v. Slovakia, App. No. 2660/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 45 (2010), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-101945;
A. v. Croatia,
App. No. 55164/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 57 (2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-101152 (including such positive measures as
rotecting the victim from arbitrary action by public authorities or from violent
behaviors of an abuser).
77. Hajduovi, App. No. 2660/03, 50; Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur.
129 (2009), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
Ct. H.R.
51; Kontrova, App. No.
search.aspx?i=001-92945; Tomagid, App. No. 46598/06,
7510/04,150.
195-96;
78. Kalucza, App. No. 57693/10, IT 64, 68; Opuz, App. No. 33401/02,

43 (2009), available at
E.S. v. Slovakia, App. No. 8227/04, Eur. Ct. H.R.
Bevacqua, App.
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-93955;
No. 71127/01, T 76; MC., App. No. 39272/98, 184.
65-67; Opuz, App. No. 33401/02, T 148, 171;
79. Kalucza, App. No. 57693/10,
E.S., App. No. 8227/04, T 43.
80. Hajduovd, App. No. 2660/03, 1 50; A., App. No. 55164/08, 1 78; Tomagic,
55-56.
App. No. 46598/06,
81. EUR. CONSULT. Ass., Recommendation Rec (2002)5 of the Committee of
Ministers to Member States on the Protection of Women Against Violence, 794th Sess.
(2002) [hereinafter Rec (2002)5].
82. Id. TT 23, 29, 35.
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protective measures, protection of victims from "threats and possible acts
of revenge,"84 and appropriate compensation." The Recommendation also
notes that States should "penalise all forms of physical, sexual and
psychological violence perpetrated or condoned in situations in which the
responsibility of the state or of a third party may be invoked, for example in
boarding schools." 86 Moreover, in each of these cases, the ECHR ordered
the State to pay compensation to the victims.
Nearly all of these cases involved domestic violence, usually spousal
abuse. While the majority do not explicitly reference the State obligation
to act with due diligence, two of these cases have used that specific termOpuz v. Turkey

and Bevacqua v. Bulgaria89-and

have cited to other

international tribunals, including the Inter-American Court and
Commission in Velasquez90 and Maria da Penha,9 ' as well as CEDAW's
decisions in Yildirim v. Austria9 2 and A. T v. Hungary.9 3 They also both
reference the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women (DEVAW) 94 and the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, Its Causes and Consequences (Special Rapporteur).9 5 Opuz v.
Turkey involved years of repeated and escalating domestic violence by an
abusive husband against his wife and her mother, and culminated in his
83. Id 58.
84. Id 44.
85. Id. 36.
86. Id

78.

87. Kalucza v. Hungary, App. No. 57693/10, Eur. Ct. H.R.

1 79 (2012), available

Hajduovd v.
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110452;
64 (2010), available at
Slovakia, App. No. 2660/03, Eur. Ct. H.R.
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-101945;
A. v. Croatia,

App. No. 55164/08, Eur. Ct. H.R.

112 (2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/

sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-101152; E.S. v. Slovakia, App. No. 8227/04, Eur.
Ct. H.R. N 57 (2009), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-93955; Tomagid v. Croatia, App. No. 46598/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 82
(2009), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=002-1695;
214 (2009), available at
Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R.
v.
Bevacqua
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-92945;
101 (2008), available at
Bulgaria, App. No. 71127/01, Eur. Ct. H.R.
v.
Kontrova
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/research/bulgaria/BEVACQUA.pdf,
Slovakia, App. No. 7510/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 76 (2007); M.C. v. Bulgaria, App. No.
http://www.unhcr.org/
201 (2003), available at
39272/98, Eur. Ct. H.R.
refworld/docid/47bl 9f492.html.
88. Opuz, App. No. 33401/02, 149.
89. Bevacqua, App. No. 71127/01, 73.
90. Id. 53; Opuz, App. No. 33401/02, 83.
91. Bevacqua, App. No. 71127/01, 53; Opuz, App. No. 33401/02, 86.
92. Opuz, App. No. 33401/02, 1 77.
93. Bevacqua, App. No. 71127/01, 53.
94. Id. 52; Opuz, App. No. 33401/02, 78.
95. Bevacqua, App. No. 71127/01, 53; Opuz, App. No. 33401/02, 79.
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murdering the mother. 96 Based on evidence of widespread problems
enforcing the protection order law, 9 7 poor treatment of victims by police, 98
and "the general and discriminatory judicial passivity in Turkey [that]
created a climate that was conducive to domestic violence," 99 the ECHR
additionally found the State responsible for violating guarantees of equal
protection. 00 In addition, the ECHR noted concerns with Turkey's
criminal law, including its lack of "an adequate deterrent effect capable of
ensuring .. . effective prevention,"' 0 1 and that State officials made the
decision not to prosecute, "without conducting any meaningful
investigation," even in the face of serious attacks and severe injuries.102
Altogether, it expressed concern that the abuser's "impunity"l03 meant that
"the violence suffered by the applicant had not come to an end and that the
authorities had continued to display inaction,"1 0 4 and admonished the State
that "in domestic violence cases perpetrators' rights cannot supersede
victims' human rights to life and to physical and mental integrity." 05
Some of these themes were echoed in an earlier case, M C. v. Bulgaria,
involving an acquaintance gang-rape of a 14-year-old girl.10 6 In that case,
while the ECHR made clear, as it has done elsewhere, that "it cannot
replace the domestic authorities in the assessment of the facts of the case[,]
nor can it decide on the alleged perpetrators' criminal responsibility," 0 7 it
stated that it could review whether the State had fulfilled its "positive
obligation to conduct an official investigation,"'0 8 which "may extend to
questions relating to the effectiveness of a criminal investigation."' 09 In
finding violations of those positive obligations, particular faults identified
by the ECHR included that the investigating officials made no credibility
assessments of the defendants and their witnesses despite "the presence of
96. Opuz, App. No. 33401/02, TT 7-54.
97. Id.
195-96.
98. Id. 192.
99. Id. 198.
100. Id. 191.
101. Id. 153.
102. Id. 169.
103. Id.
104. Id. 173.
105. Id. 147.
106. M.C. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 39272/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. 10 (2003), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47bl9f492.html.
107. Id. 168; see also Hajduovd v. Slovakia, App. No. 2660/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 47
(2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001101945 (declining to substitute the Court's judgment for that of domestic authorities in
matters pertaining to protecting an individual's personal integrity).
108. MC., App. No. 39272/98, T 151.

109. Id. T 152.
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two irreconcilable versions of the facts," 0 delayed the investigation,"' and
"attach[ed] little weight to the particular vulnerability of young persons."ll 2
The ECHR drew the existence of the positive obligations from a much
earlier 1985 case, X & Y v. Netherlands,'13 involving the rape of a 16-yearold girl with mental disabilities by an adult male without mental disabilities
at the privately-owned facility where the girl lived." 4 Thus, although the
ECHR has not, until recently, described its recognition of the State's
responsibility to protect individual actors from violence by other individual
actors as "due diligence," this doctrine parallels the due diligence approach
both in substance and in its origins in a case involving violence against
women. In fact, given that case's age and the repeated invocation of it in
this line of cases, the ECHR's recognition of the due diligence concept
could be seen as pre-dating its recognition in the Inter-American and U.N.
systems.
Finally, the State's responsibility to act with due diligence has been
recognized in many non-tribunal settings, enough so that, combined with
its use by tribunals, the Special Rapporteur could justifiably characterize it
as a rule of customary international law." 5 These international bodies
include the United Nations General Assembly, whose members voted to
issue DEVAW,ll 6 and CEDAW, which issued General Recommendation
19 regarding violence against women.1 7 The Organization of American
States' Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women (Convention of Beldm do Pard)
entered into force in 1995,18 and in 2011 the Council of Europe's
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and
Domestic Violence opened for signature." 9 Moreover, as noted by the
Special Rapporteur herself, the due diligence concept was explicitly

110. Id. 177.
111. Id. 184.
112. Id. 183.
113. X & Y v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1985), available at
http://www.juridischeuitspraken.nl/19850326EHRMXenYtegenNederland.pdf.
114. Id. f 7-8.
115. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and

Consequences on the Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence

against Women, Comm'n on Human Rights, 62nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/ 1
(Jan. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur Rep.], available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45377afb0.html.
116. DEVAW, supra note 16, at Art. 4, Sec. (c).
117. Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 15, 1 9.
118. Convention of Beldm do Pari, supra note 17, at 92.
119. Council of Europe, Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against
Women and Domestic Violence, May 11, 2011, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/2 10.htm.
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referenced in the Commission on Human Rights resolution creating the
Special Rapporteur in 1994,120 and is regularly referenced in United
Nations' reports regarding gender-based violence. 121 This last category
includes a 2006 study conducted by the Secretary-General, which devotes a
significant portion of its report to States' "duty to prevent acts of violence
against women; to investigate such acts when they occur and prosecute and
punish perpetrators; and to provide redress and relief to the victims."l 2 2
Like the Inter-American jurisprudence on violence against women, many
of these sources also connect gender-based violence and gender
discrimination as a cause and consequence of each other. For instance, the
Secretary-General's report states that "violence against women is not the
result of random, individual acts of misconduct, but rather is deeply rooted
in structural relationships of inequality between women and men."123
Therefore, eliminating gender-based violence requires "addressing
discrimination, promoting women's equality and empowerment, and
ensuring that women's human rights are fulfilled."l 2 4 Moreover, "[w]ithin
the broad context of women's subordination," State inaction is a "specific
causal factor[] for violence."l 25 Indeed,
"(w]hen the State fails to hold the perpetrators of violence accountable,
this not only encourages further abuses, it also gives the message that
male violence against women is acceptable or normal. The result of such
impunity is not only denial of justice to the individual victims/survivors,
but also reinforcement
26 of prevailing inequalities that affect other women
and girls as well."1
Thus, Lenahan functions as one of the most recent applications of a
collective entity responsibility theory that has been developing in multiple
venues around the world for over two decades-a theory widespread
enough to be characterized as a rule of customary international law. This
theory attributes responsibility for gender-based violence to the collective
entity of the State based on how the State's actions or inactions "condone,"
"encourage," "facilitate," "promote," "perpetuate," and "sustain" genderbased violence by non-State actors or those who cannot be confirmed to be
State actors. 127 This encouragement, moreover, is accomplished when the
120. Rec (2002)5, supra note 81, at 8.
121. Special Rapporteur Rep., supra note 115, at 8.
122. U.N. SEC'Y-GEN., ENDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, FROM WORDS TO
ACTION (2006) [hereinafter SEC'Y-GEN. STUDY], available at http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/public/VAWStudy/VAWstudyE.pdf
123. Id. at ii.
124. Id. at i.
125. Id. at ii.
126. Id. at iv-v.
127. Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
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State fails to act with due diligence to prevent violence; investigate
violence when it occurs; prosecute and sanction those who perpetrate it; or
compensate those who are victims of it. Failing to do these things when the
State knows of general problems or specific instances of violence against
women creates an "environment" or "climate" of "impunity." It is also
inextricably linked to patriarchy and discrimination, which the theory
includes as both cause and consequence of gender-based violence. As a
result, the failure of a State to fulfill its due diligence responsibility
represents a serious barrier to the goal of ending gender-based violence and
discrimination.
II. SCHOOL RESPONSIBILITY
The focus on environment and climate in the State responsibility theory
echoes the focus of that theory's U.S. domestic law analogue: hostile
environment sexual harassment theory. As noted above, U.S. hostile
environment sexual harassment theory developed first in the employment
context, under Title VII's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.
However, the focus of this Part is on the more recent development of
hostile environment sexual harassment jurisprudence under Title IX, which
prohibits sex discrimination in educational settings.12 8 This focus is due to
the fact that schools play a more "State-like" role in their students' lives
than do most employers in their employees' lives. Most particularly,
schools and school officials have disciplinary authority over student
behavior that more closely approximates a State's than an employer's
authority, at least in the popular imagination.129 In some cases, such as
boarding schools or colleges and universities, schools can also function as
their students' place of residence, further increasing the school's
pervasiveness in, and impact on, a student's life.
U.S. schools are also the site of a distressingly large amount of genderbased violence, including sexual violence and dating or relationship
violence (similar to domestic violence except occurring within a noncohabiting dating or romantic relationship). Sexual violence in schools
80/11,

126 (2011).

128. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 632 (1999) (discussing
the standard by which school boards and districts can be held liable for Title IX
violations).
129. In reality, States and schools are quite different, because schools have a lot less
power than States do, particularly in terms of responding to misconduct. In fact, the
worst punishment schools can levy is expulsion from the school, as opposed to the
State's powers to imprison and even execute nationals. Schools even lack such State
powers as the subpoena. For more information regarding this comparison, see
generally Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Campus Violence: Understanding the Extraordinary
Through the Ordinary, 35 J.C. & U.L. 613, 627-80 (2009), available at

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1457343.
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occurs most often between students, although teacher-perpetrated sexual
harassment and violence directed at students is not an insignificant
phenomenon. To give a brief sense of the scope of the violence,
comprehensive studies on campus-based, peer sexual violence that have
been completed over the last several decades consistently find that 20-25%
of college women are victims of attempted or completed nonconsensual sex
during their time in college.130 In addition, "[w]omen ages 16 to 24
experience rape at rates four times higher than the assault rate of all
women, making the college (and high school) years the most vulnerable for
women. [Furthermore,] college women are more at risk for rape and other
forms of sexual assault than women the same age but not in college."'31
The vast majority of this violence is committed by someone known to
the victim. 132 In one study, 12.8% of completed rapes, 35% of attempted

130. Brenda J. Benson et al., College Women and Sexual Assault: The Role of Sex-

Related Alcohol Expectancies, 22 J. FAM. VIOL. 341, 348 (2007); CHRISTOPHER P.
KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT STUDY: FINAL REPORT 5-3 (2007),

available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf (finding that 19% of
students in the sample had experienced attempted or completed sexual assault since
entering college, but noting that over 50% of the sample had completed less than 2
years of college and therefore discussing the incidence reported by college seniors,

where 26% had experienced attempted or completed sexual assault since entering

college, to predict a woman's risk during her overall college career); see also BONNIE
S. FISHER ET AL., THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN 10 (2000),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/182369.pdf, CAROL BOHMER &
ANDREA PARROT, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS: THE PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION

6

(1993). Note: although some of the studies that are cited here are somewhat old, they
are included because the findings of the older studies are quite consistent with the most
recent ones, even when the studies have been conducted in different decades. This
indicates that the findings of older studies are still valid in terms of what we see today.
131. See RANA SAMPSON, ACQUAINTANCE RAPE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS 2 (2003),
availableat http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e03021472.pdf But see KATRINA BAUM &
PATSY KLAUS, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE
STUDENTS, 1995-2002, at 3 (2005), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/

pub/pdf/vvcs02.pdf (finding that college students were less likely to be the victim of
sexual assault than non-students). The discrepancy in these two findings is due to the

wording of questions asked during data collection. The conclusions of Baum and

Klaus are based on the National Crime Victimization Survey, which gathers
information on sexual assault by asking category-centered questions, such as "[h]as
anyone attacked or threatened you in [this way]: rape, attempted rape or other type of
sexual attack." Id. The conclusions that Sampson cites are based on studies such as the
National College Women Sexual Victimization study, which use behavior-oriented
questions, such as "[h]as anyone made you have sexual intercourse by using force or
threatening to harm you or someone close to you?" See FISHER ET AL., supra note 130,

at 6, 13 (explicitly comparing the difference between the National Crime Victimization
Survey

methodology and

results and

the National

College

Women

Sexual

Victimization study methodology and results). Other than the wording of the
questions, the basic methodology of the two studies was identical, yet behaviororiented questions have been found to produce eleven times the number of reported
rapes. Id. at 13.
132. See SAMPSON, supra note 131, at 3 (stating that ninety percent of college

women who are victims of rape know their assailant); see also KREBS ET AL., supra
note 130, at 5-18; FISHER ET AL., supra note 130, at 17.

252

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 21:2

rapes, and 22.9% of threatened rapes took place on a date. 133 Typical
perpetrators include classmates and friends of the survivor and boyfriends
or ex-boyfriends.13 4 Studies of college men indicate that 6-14.9% of them
and
"report acts that meet legal definitions for rape or attempted rape,"
that a small number of repeat perpetrators commit most of the sexual
violence and likely contribute to other violence problems as well. 13 6
While most studies on high school students have not focused on the
occurrence of sexual violence among these students, dating and
relationship violence among high school students has been examined a fair
amount, and these studies have shown that dating/relationship violence is a
similarly widespread phenomenon. Specifically, studies have found that
about one in three high school students have experienced dating
violence.13 7 25% of teenagers ages fourteen to seventeen say they know a
student who has been a victim of dating violence,'3 8 including 40% of
girls.' 39 "20% of surveyed male students report witnessing someone with
whom they go to high school physically hit a person they were dating."l40
Same-sex dating partners appear to experience similar rates of violence as
heterosexual couples.141 "One-third or more of teens in relationships have
been with a partner who frequently asked where they were and whom they
were with," 4 2 and "30% . . . say they are text messaged 10, 20, or 30 times
an hour by a partner inquiring where they are, what they're doing, or who
they're with.',14 3 "One in four teens in serious relationships have been
prevented from spending time with friends and family or pressured to only
133. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 130, at 17.
134. See id at 19 (providing statistics that show that over ninety percent of
completed and eighty percent of attempted rapes are committed by offenders who are
either a classmate, friend, or boyfriend of the victim); see also KREBS ET AL., supra
note 130, at 5-15.
135. David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending Among
UndetectedRapists, 17 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 73, 73 (2002).
136. See id. at 78-80 (noting that 68.4% of repeat rapists admit to other forms of
violence, compared to 40.9% of single-act rapists); see also WALTER S. DEKESEREDY
& MARTIN D. SCHWARTZ, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON THE COLLEGE CAMPUS: THE ROLE OF
MALE PEER SUPPORT 12 (1997).
137. Dating Violence, ALA. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
http://www.acadv.org/dating.html#statistics (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).
138. THE CLOTHESLINE PROJECT, TEEN DATING VIOLENCE FACTS 2 (2006)
[hereinafter CLOTHESLINE PROJECT], available at http://www.clotheslineproject.org/
teendatingviolencefacts.pdf
139. Dating Violence, supranote 137.
140. CLOTHESLINE PROJECT, supra note 138, at 2.
141. Id. at 1.
142. 10 Teen DatingAbuse Facts, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ONLINE RESOURCES,

http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/teendatingabusefacts/teendatingabusefacts.html
(last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
143. Id
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spend time with their partner,"l 4 4 and "39% of female high school students
report that students talk in school about whether someone is attempting to
control the person they are dating."l 4 5
In light of these distressing statistics and the even more disturbing
individual stories that come out through the cases, Title IX's hostile
environment sexual harassment theory has been increasingly used to
combat this problem. Title IX prohibits sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination on the part of a school when that school is allowing a hostile
environment to be created and/or continued by violence.14 6 Peer sexual
violence is generally considered a case of hostile environment sexual
harassment that is "so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it
effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or
benefit." 47 Because of the severity of sexual violence, generally, even a
of violence will be considered hostile environment sexual
single instance
48

harassment.1

Because Title IX regards the school as the one that is responsible-and
therefore liable-for protecting its students from sexual harassment, the
legal theory of sexual harassment puts the primary legal responsibility for
preventing and responding to harassment on institutions. Title IX is
enforced in two ways when peer sexual violence is at issue: first, through a
survivor's private right of action against her school,14 9 and second, through
administrative enforcement by the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of the
Department of Education. 5 o Both enforcement jurisdictions derive from
the fact that schools agree to comply with Title IX in order to receive

144. Id.
145. CLOTHESLINE PROJECT, supra note 138, at 2; see also Lisa Vollendorf Martin,
What's Love Got to Do With It: Securing Access to Justicefor Teens, 61 CATH. U. L.
REV. 457 (2012) (reviewing the teen dating violence problem and suggesting changes
to state civil protection order statutes to better protect teen dating violence victims).
146. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT
OF STUDENT BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 2 (2001)
[hereinafter REVISED GUIDANCE], available at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/
archives/pdf/shguide.pdf.

147. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 632 (1999).
148. See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 146, at 6 ("The more severe the conduct,
the less the need to show a repetitive series of incidents; this is particularly true if the
harassment is physical. For instance, if the conduct is more severe, e.g., attempts to
grab a female student's breasts or attempts to grab any student's genital area or
buttocks, it need not be as persistent to create a hostile environment. Indeed, a single
or isolated incident of sexual harassment may, if sufficiently severe, create a hostile
environment.").

149. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 70 (1992); Cannon v.
Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
150. See EDUCATOR'S GUIDE TO CONTROLLING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Hicks ed., 2008) [hereinafter EDUCATOR'S GUIDE].
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federal funds. 5 1
The private right of action requires a plaintiff/survivor to reach the
standard set out by two Supreme Court cases, Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District 52 and Davis v. Monroe County Board of

Education.153 Under this standard, a plaintiff must show that a school acted
with "deliberate indifference" in the face of "actual knowledge" of an
incident of sexual violence.154 If a plaintiff can meet that standard, the
damages that the school could be required to pay are quite significant, thus
providing schools with a significant incentive to comply with Title IX.
Because settlements and jury awards can be quite large in these cases,
55
with several settlements coming in at the seven- and six-figure marks,
these cases show that schools can face significant liability if they respond
to a report of sexual violence in a way that is not protective of student
survivors. Moreover, the focus of this case law is forward-looking,
scrutinizing whether the school's institutional responses would avoid or
lead to further risk for, or actual occurrence of, harassment or violence
against a survivor.
Courts have defined an institutional response as deliberately indifferent
"'when the defendant's response to known discrimination is clearly
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances, and when remedial
action only follows after a lengthy and unjustified delay.' The deliberate
indifference 'must, at a minimum, cause students to undergo harassment or

151. See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 146, at 2-3 ("Title IX applies to all public
and private educational institutions that receive Federal funds, i.e., recipients,
including, but not limited to, elementary and secondary schools, school districts,
proprietary schools, colleges and universities.").

152. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
153. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
154. S.S. v. Alexander, 177 P.3d 724, 726 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); see also Vance v.
Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 258-59 (6th Cir. 2000); Soper v. Hoben,
195 F.3d 845, 854 (6th Cir. 1999).
155. According to publicly available information, the largest settlement in a Title IX
case to date was in Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th
Cir. 2007), when two college women were gang-raped as a part of an unsupervised
football recruiting program that the university had evidence was leading to sexual
violence. The university ultimately paid $2.85 million to the plaintiffs, hired a special
Title IX analyst, and fired some thirteen university officials, including the President
and football coach. See Diane L. Rosenfeld, Changing Social Norms? Title IX and
Legal Activism: Concluding Remarks, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 407, 418 (2008).
Other large settlements include an $850,000 settlement by Arizona State University in
a case where a student was raped by a football player who had been expelled for
misconduct, including sexual harassment, but was readmitted after intervention by the
coach. Tessa Muggeridge, ASU Settlement Ends in $850,000 Payoff, STATE PRESS
In addition, the
(Feb. 3, 2009), http://www.statepress.com/archive/node/4020.
University of Georgia paid a six-figure settlement to a plaintiff who was raped by
several athletes, including one who the university knew had a criminal record before he
was admitted to the university. See also Rosenfeld, supra, at 420.
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make them liable or vulnerable to it."'l 56 In the case of peer sexual
violence, schools are rarely held responsible for the sexual violence
itself.157 Instead, the focus is on the institutional response post-violence.
As such, doing nothing at all is clearly unacceptable.'s Schools must at
least investigate claims of peer harassment, 5 9 and that investigation cannot

involve merely accepting an accused student's denial at face value and not
engaging in any credibility determinations.16 0 School officials also may not
exhibit bias in their treatment of the survivor or characterization of her
case.
For instance, courts have disapproved of school officials making
156. Doe v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., No. 3:06-cv-1680, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40269,
at *20-21 (D. Conn. May 19, 2008) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 645).
157. See Doe v. Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d 438, 445-46 (D. Conn. 2006)
(finding that since the Board could not be liable for the assault, it could only be liable
for the situation in the school after the assault); S.S., 177 P.3d at 738 (finding that while
a school may not be liable for an act of sexual harassment, the school's response may
give rise to liability); Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170
(D. Cal. 2000) (holding the school liable when specific acts known to the school
culminated in assault after the school did nothing).
158. See, e.g., Estate of Brown v. Ogletree, No. 11-cv-1491, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21968, at *54 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2012); Estate of Carmichael v. Galbraith, No. 3:11CV-0622-D, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 857, at *12 n. 6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2012); Pratt v.
Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 151 (N.D.N.Y 2011) (for a more
complete fact statement, see http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/pratt-v-indianriver-central-school-district); Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:11-cv01489, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125175, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Oct 28, 2011); Rinsky v. Trs.
Bos. Univ., No. 1:11-cv-01489, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136876, at *38 (D. Mass. Dec.
23, 2010); T.Z. v. N.Y.C., 634 F. Supp. 2d 263, 268-69 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); McGrath v.
Dominican Coll., 672 F. Supp. 2d 477, 486-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Doe ex rel Doe v.
Coventry Bd. of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 2d 226, 234 (D. Conn. 2009); C.T. v. Liberal Sch.
Dist., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1334 (D. Kan. 2008); Dawn L. v. Greater Johnstown Sch.
Dist., 586 F. Supp. 2d 332, 365 (W.D. Pa. 2008); S.G. v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., No.
08 C 50038, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95522, at *15-16 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2008); James
v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-007, No. CIV-07-434-M, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82199, at
*6 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 16, 2008); Bruning v. Carroll Cmty. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 2d
892, 915-16 (N.D. Iowa 2007); Bashus v. Plattsmouth Cmty. Sch. Dist., No.
8:06CV300, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56565, at *10 (D. Neb. Aug. 3, 2006); Doe v. Se.
Greene Sch. Dist., No. 03-717, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12790, at *14 n. 3 (W.D. Pa.
Mar. 24, 2006); Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 447-48; Doe v. E. Haven Bd.
of Educ., 430 F. Supp. 2d 54, 63-65 (D. Conn. 2006), aff'd, 200 F. App'x 46, 49 (2d
Cir. 2006); Martin v. Swartz Creek Cmty. Sch., 419 F. Supp. 2d 967, 974 (E.D. Mich.
2006); Jones v. Ind. Area Sch. Dist., 397 F. Supp. 2d 628, 645-46 (W.D. Pa. 2005);
Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1301 (D. Kan.
2005); Doe v. Perry Cmty. Sch. Dist., 316 F. Supp. 2d 809, 832 (S.D. Iowa 2004);
Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 2d 869, 874, 879 (N.D. Ohio 2003);
Henkle v. Gregory, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1078 (D. Nev. 2001); O.H. v. Oakland
Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-99-5123 (JCS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21725, at *50-51
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2000); Ray, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1170.
159. See Vance, 231 F.3d at 259; Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1248
(10th Cir. 1999); Babler v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, Case 2:10-cv-01459-RRB (D. Ariz.
Feb. 15, 2010); Ross v. Corp. of Mercer Univ., 506 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1357 (M.D. Ga.
2007); Bruning, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 915-16; Doe v. Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist., 992
F. Supp. 467, 481 (D.N.H. 1997); S.S., 177 P.3d at 738.
160. See, e.g., S.S., 177 P.3d at 740.

161. See, e.g., Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., No. 08-1008, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS
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statements indicating that they agreed with the assailants,162 laughing in the
face of the harassment,16 3 publicly characterizing a sexual assault as "not
legal rape," 64 adopting an inappropriately lenient response to a rape by a
perpetrator whose father was on the school board,165 and changing their
previously sympathetic behavior after the victim revealed her assailant's
name, telling her that her assailant was "very bright, very intelligent, and
'going places,"' and refusing to enforce a judicial stay-away order.16 6
Moreover, schools certainly may not tell sexual violence victims not to tell
others,167 and unjustified delay in responding can result in a school being
viewed as deliberately indifferent. 68
25, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2009); Doe v. Galster, No. 09-C-1089, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77706, at *19 (E.D. Wis. Jul 14, 2011); Terrell v. Del. State Univ., No. 09-464
(GMS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74841, at *6 (D. Del. July 23, 2010); Albiez v.
Kaminski, No. 09-CV-1127, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59373, at *17-18 (E.D. Wis. June
14, 2010); Marcum ex rel. C.V. v. Bd. of Educ. of Bloom-Carroll Local Sch. Dist., 727
F. Supp. 2d 657, 668 (S. D. Ohio 2010); McGrath, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 477; Dawn L.,
586 F. Supp. 2d at 370; Doe v. Brimfield Grade Sch., 552 F. Supp. 2d 816, 823 (C.D.
Ill. 2008); Siewert v. Spencer-Owen Cmty. Sch. Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 942, 954 (S.D.
Ind. 2007); Doe v. Erskine Coll., No. 8:04-23001-RBH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35780,
at *33-34 (D.S.C. May 25, 2006); Theno, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-11; Kelly v. Yale
Univ., No. 3:01-CV-1591, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4543, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 26,
2003); Snelling v. Fall Mountain Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. 99-448-JD, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3591, at *18 (D.N.H. 2001); S.S., 177 P.3d at 740.
162. See Patterson,2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25, at *4; Brimfield, 552 F. Supp. 2d at
823; Siewert, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 954; Theno, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-11.
163. See Patterson, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25, at *4; Brimfield, 552 F. Supp. 2d at
823; Theno, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1310.
164. Kelly, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4543, at *3.
165. Doe v. Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d 438, 447.
166. Erskine Coll., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35780, at *33-34.
167. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 64 (1992) (noting
with disapproval the failure of the school to report peer sexual violence to law
enforcement or to inform the survivor of her right to do so); Vance v. Spencer Cnty.
Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 262 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting with disapproval the failure
of the school to report peer sexual violence to law enforcement or to inform the
survivor of her right to do so); Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1248 (10th
Cir. 1999) (finding that after a male student repeatedly raped a student with spastic
cerebral palsy, the school did not inform and told the victim not to inform her mother);
Doe v. Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467, 479 (D.N.H. 1997) (finding
that two girls were harassed repeatedly by a boy who exposed himself to them and
touched them on their legs and breasts on the school bus and in school; when they
reported the behavior, the school's guidance counselor told them not to tell their
parents because it could subject the school to lawsuits).
168. See, e.g., Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007)
(finding the school took eight months to respond to reports of a gang rape); Evans v.
Bd. of Educ. Sw. Sch. Dist., No. 2:08-CV-794, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72926 (S.D.
Ohio July 20, 2010) (denying school's motion for summary judgment on Title IX
claims when school did not respond to two 12-year-old girls' reports of sexual
harassment by male students on school bus, including escalating incidents of verbal
harassment, pulling down the girls' pants, exposing their breasts and forcing one to
perform oral sex,] and eventually suspended both the victim and the perpetrator of the
forced oral sex incident, even when the perpetrator pled guilty to attempted assault in a
separate criminal proceeding); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Coventry Bd. of Educ., 630 F. Supp.
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If their investigations indicate that harassment did occur, school officials
are required to take some kind of action, and the cases indicate that courts
are concerned with how that action increases or decreases the likelihood of
future violence. In the discipline category, the case law shows that,
although it is acknowledged that victims have no right to demand any
particular disciplinary or remedial action on the part of a school,'6 9 some
kind of disciplinary action is likely required, and it should not discipline
both the alleged victim and assailant equally.' 70 However, the cases also
put a premium on "interim measures" short of disciplinary action, most
particularly separating the victim from the perpetrator and protecting her
from having to interact with her assailant.'7 1 Therefore, these cases as a
2d 226, 234 (D. Conn. 2009) (denying summary judgment to school when a male
student sexually assaulted a female student off school grounds and the school took no
disciplinary action against the assailant (permitting him "to continue attending school
with [plaintiff] for three years after the assault, leaving constant potential for
interactions between the two"), engaged in unreasonable delay by allowing the two
students to share a lunch period and class for over six months after the school was
notified of the assault, and allowed the assailant's "friends [to] verbally harass [and

threaten] her in school"); Doe v. E. Haven Bd. of Educ., 430 F. Supp. 2d 54, 64 (D.
Conn. 2006), aff'd 200 F. App'x 46, 49.
169. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 175 (1st Cir. 2007);
Doe v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., No. 3:06-cv-1680, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40269, at *22
(D. Conn. May 19, 2008); Kelly, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4543, at *4; Clark v. Bibb
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1374 (M.D. Ga. 2001).
170. See, e.g., Vance, 231 F.3d at 262 (6th Cir. 2000); Estate of Brown v. Ogletree,
No. I1-cv-1491, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21968, at * 54 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2012); Doe
v. Galster, No. 09-C-1089, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77706, at *19 (E.D. Wis. July 14,
2011); Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 152; Evans, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72926, at *24; Terrell v. Del. State Univ., No. 09-464 (GMS), 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74841, at *7 (D. Del. July 23, 2010); Marcum ex rel. C.V. v. Bd. of
Educ. of Bloom-Carroll Local Sch. Dist., 727 F. Supp. 2d 657 (S.D. Ohio 2010);
Coventry Bd. of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 2d at 226; T.Z. v. N.Y.C., 634 F. Supp. 2d 263
(E.D.N.Y. 2009); C.T. v. Liberal Sch. Dist., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1335 (D. Kan.
2008); Jones v. Kern High Sch. Dist., No. CV-F-07-1628, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
74040 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2008); Hamden Bd. of Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
40269, at *6-7; M. v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., No. 3:05-cv-0177, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51933, at *28 (D. Conn. July 7, 2008); Siewert v. Spencer-Owen Cmty. Sch. Corp.,
497 F. Supp. 2d 942, 954 (S.D. Ind. 2007); Annamaria M. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch.
Dist., No. C 03-0101 VRW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38641, at *11-12 (N.D. Cal. May
30, 2006); Doe v. Se. Greene Sch. Dist., No. 03-717, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12790, at
*4-5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2006); Erskine Coll., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35780, at *35;
Derby Bd of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 447; Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist.

No. 464, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 13 10-1 (D. Kan. 2005); Doe v. Perry Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
316 F. Supp. 2d 809, 835 (S.D. Iowa 2004); Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ., 296 F.
Supp. 2d 869 (D. Iowa 2004); Henkle v. Gregory, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (D. Nev.
2001); Snelling v. Fall Mountain Reg'1 Sch. Dist., No. 99-448-JD, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3591, at *15 (D.N.H. Mar. 21, 2001); O.H. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., No.
C-99-5123 (JCS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21725, at *51 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2000);
Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. at 481; S.S. v. Alexander, 177 P.3d 724,
739 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).

171. See Hamden Bd. of Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40269, at *17 ("Further
encounters, of any sort, between a rape victim and her attacker could create an

environment sufficiently hostile to deprive the victim of access to educational
opportunities provided to her at school.").
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whole indicate that courts are primarily concerned with schools taking
actions that will protect victims, and they do not require "punishment" of
perpetrators just for punishment's sake; rather they do so because
sanctioning assists in preventing future violence.
This concern with victim protection is present, on the one hand, in cases
where the school responses were found as a matter of law to be adequate
under Title IX, and the cases were therefore dismissed prior to a trial by a
jury. Two clear trends emerge from these cases. First, once a school has
knowledge of an incident of sexual violence, the case law suggests that
separating the students involved can help a school avoid a "deliberate
indifference" finding.1 72 Moreover, in the majority of these cases, the
separation of the students was achieved by moving the alleged
perpetrator,173 suspending the alleged perpetrator,1 7 4 or both. Second, a
smaller group of schools have avoided being found deliberately indifferent
because they expelled the perpetrators after determining them to be
172. See, e.g., Watkins v. La Marque Indep. Sch. Dist., 308 Fed. App'x. 781 (5th
Cir. 2009); Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 74 (1st Cir. 2007); Gabrielle M.
v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights, 315 F.3d 817, 825 (7th Cir. 2003); P.K. v. Caesar
Rodney High Sch., No. 10-CV-783 (GMS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9572, at *23-24 (D.
Del. Jan. 27, 2012); Brooks v. City of Phila., 747 F. Supp. 2d 477, 487 (E.D. Pa. 2010);
Marshall v. Batesville Sch. Dist., No. 1:05-CV-05 (CDL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
99663, at *12, 13 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 9, 2008); Addison v. Clarke Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No.
3:06-CV-05 (CDL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56166, at *15 (M.D. Ga. July 30, 2007);
Lewis v. Booneville Sch. Dist., No. 1:06-CV-091, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24976, at *45 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 2, 2007); Theriault v. Univ. of S. Me., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.
Me. 2004); Doe v. Lennox Sch. Dist. No. 41-4, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1068 (D.S.D.
2003); Ings-Ray v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 02-CV-3615, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7683,
at *11 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2003); C.R.K. v. U.S.D. 260, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6326
(D. Kan. Jan. 30, 2002); Clark, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1369; KF's Father v. Marriott, No.
CA 00-0215-C, 2001 WL 228353, at *16-17 (S.D. Ala. 2001); Wilson v. Beaumont
Indep. Sch. Dist., 144 F. Supp. 2d 690, 693 (E.D. Tex. 2001); Manfredi v. Mount
Vernon Bd. of Educ., 94 F. Supp. 2d 447, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Vaird v. Sch. Dist. of
Phila., No. CIV. A. 99-2727, 2000 WL 57644, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 2000). Only three cases
differ in some respects from the clear weight of this authority regarding separating
students involved in sexual violence. See Doe v. Univ. of the Pac., 457 Fed. App'x.
685, 688 (9th Cir. 2012); Pemberton v. W. Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., No. 09-30, 2012
WL 443860, at *4 (M.D. La. 2012); O'Hara, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12153
(dismissing plaintiffs claims when she was sexually assaulted repeatedly throu h
sexual touching of breasts and genitalia by a male classmate, only reporting the assaults
when the assailant became violent, after which the school suspended the assailant for
seventy days, and then allowed him to return to school, when he "could occasionally be
found in the same vicinity as the plaintiff and . . . would stare at her").
173. See Watkins, 308 Fed. App'x. at 781; Porto, 488 F.3d at 74; GabrielleM, 315

F.3d at 825; Addison, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56166, at *15; Lewis, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24976, at *4-5; Theriault, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 15; Lennox Sch. Dist., 329 F.
Supp. 2d at 1068; Ings-Ray, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7683, at *11; C.R.K., 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6326; Clark, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1369; Wilson, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 693;
Manfredi, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 455; Vaird, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6492, at 3.
174. See Caesar Rodney High Sch., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9572, at *23-24;

Marshall,2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99663, at *12-13; Theriault, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 15;
Lennox Sch. Dist., 329 F. Supp. 2d at 1068; Clark, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1369; Vaird,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6492, at *3.
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responsible for peer sexual violence. 7 1
On the other hand are the cases where courts have not dismissed the case
and allowed it to proceed to a jury due to evidence that schools have not
protected the victim from retaliation from the alleged perpetrator or other
students as a result of her report. 17 6 Some of these cases indicate that
schools will be liable for failing to take steps to protect the victim from
having to constantly confront her assailant while continuing with her
education. 77 Such cases include Doe v. Derby Board of Education, where
175. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. N. Allegheny Sch. Dist., No. 2:08cv1383, 2011 WL
3667279, at *9 (W.D. Pa. 2011); Snethen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Savannah, No.
406CV259, 2008 WL 766569, at *5 (S.D. Ga. 2008); Fortune ex rel. Fortune v. Detroit
Pub. Schs., 2004 WL 2291333, at *33 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
176. See, e.g., Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., No. 08-1008, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS

25, at *67 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2009); Doe v. E. Haven Bd. of Educ., 430 F. Supp. 2d 54,
59-60 (2d Cir. 2006); Doe v. Galster, No. 09-C-1089, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77706, at
*22 (E.D. Wis. July 14, 2011); Terrell v. Del. State Univ., No. 09-464 (GMS), 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74841, at *6 (D. Del. July 23, 2010); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Coventry
Bd. of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 2d 226, 237 (D. Conn. 2009); C.T. v. Liberal Sch. Dist., 562
F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1336-37 (D. Kan. 2008); Hamden Bd. of Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 40269, at *5-6; M. v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., No. 3:05-cv-0177, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 51933, at *28 (D. Conn. July 7, 2008); James v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-007,
No. CIV-07-434-M, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82199, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 16, 2008);
S.G. v. Rockford Bd. Of Educ., No. 08 C 50038, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95522, at *10,
*15-16 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2008); Bashus v. Plattsmouth Cmty. Sch. Dist., No.
8:06CV300, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56565, at *10-11 (D. Neb. Aug. 3, 2006); Doe v.
Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d 438, 444-45 (D. Conn. 2006); Doe v. Erskine
Coll., No. 8:04-23001-RBH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35780, at *39 (D.S.C. May 25,
2006); Martin v. Swartz Creek Cmty. Sch., 419 F. Supp. 2d 967, 974 (E.D. Mich.
2006); Jones v. Ind. Area Sch. Dist., 397 F. Supp. 2d 628, 645-46 (W.D. Pa. 2005);
Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1310-11 (D.
Kan. 2005). In addition to these cases, in two cases where the school was granted
summary judgment on the plaintiffs deliberate indifference claim, the courts allowed
the plaintiffs claim alleging that the school itself retaliated to proceed to a jury:
Pemberton, 2012 WL 443860, at *8 (finding that the school did not act with deliberate
indifference but denying the school's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs
retaliation claim when the school initiated an investigation into her residency and
dropped her from the school when she complained after three male students attacked
and groped her after school); Marcum ex rel. C.V. v. Bd. of Educ. of Bloom-Carroll
Local Sch. Dist., 727 F. Supp. 2d 657, 676 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (denying the deliberate
indifference claim but granting the retaliation claim of 12-year-old girl who was
sexually assaulted on the school bus by a 17-year-old boy, suspended along with the
boy for 10 days, complained about students harassing her by calling her a "slut" and
"whore" for four days after her return to school, and was then suspended and expelled
for the alleged theft of a wallet and iPod). Only one case is a full outlier on this issue:
Univ. of the Pac., 457 Fed. App'x. 685, 688 (concluding in an unpublished opinion that
the district court "did not err" in its decision rejecting plaintiffs claims that the school
had not adequately investigated suspicions that one of the men who raped plaintiff was
involved in the gang-rape of another woman the month prior to plaintiffs rape, had
acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiffs rape "by requiring her to be in contact
with her assailants when it refused to expel two of the men," and had retaliated against
plaintiff for her Title IX complaint).
177. See Hamden Bd. of Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40269, at *17; S.G., 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95522, at *10; Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 444; Erskine
Coll., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35780, at *33-34; Kelly v. Yale Univ., No. 3:01-CV1591 (JCH), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4543, at *11-12 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2003); S.S. v.
Alexander, 177 P.3d at 742, 745 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
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the victim and assailant went to school in the same building, and the school
suspended the perpetrator for ten days but then allowed him to return to
school."' In finding that these actions could be judged by a jury to be
deliberately indifferent to the harassment, the court stated that even if the
assailant in the case had not harassed the victim following the rape, the
school's actions could be judged to be deliberately indifferent because they
allowed for the possibility of contacts between the victim and assailant. 7 9
Similarly, in Doe v. Hamden Board of Education, the victim was raped by
another student during the summer and off the grounds of her high school.
The court stated that exposing a victim to "[flurther encounters, of any
sort" with her assailant could create a hostile environment."'
Although the courts in the cases cited above seem to indicate that no
subsequent harassment occurred, victims actually often face a good deal of
harassment and retaliation after reporting violence, whether the harassment
is from the accused perpetrator or his friends. In the two cases just
mentioned, one student was harassed by her assailant's friends, who would
drive by her and shout "slut" from their vehicle, 81 and the other was
subjected to five weeks of constant harassment by classmates, including
being called "a slut, a liar, a bitch, [and] a whore," harassment that
eventually resulted in a trip to the hospital when the plaintiff threatened

178. Derby Bd. OfEduc., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 441.

179. See id. at 444 (explaining a school district's lack of action in response to a rape
outside of school grounds can be found to be deliberate).
180. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40269, at *16-17; see also
RockfordBd ofEduc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95522, at *2-3, *10-11 (first-grader who
"sexually batter[ed], harass[ed] and abuse[d]" plaintiff first-grader, continued to stalk
the victim at the school, directing sexual innuendos and comments that she was "hot"
to her when he was not disciplined in any way). Note that in all three cases, the courts
noted that the victims ended up having to change schools themselves in order to avoid
their assailants. See Hamden Bd of Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40269, at *17;
RockfordBd. of Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95522, at *12; Derby Bd of Educ., 451

F. Supp. 2d at 445 (showing that a female student transferred schools after being raped
and harassed by her assailant's friends). Indeed, many of the plaintiffs in these cases
end up leaving their schools. See also Patterson, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25 at *12
(showing how student was psychologically unable to set foot in the school due to
continued harassment that occurred); Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d
253, 256-57 (6th Cir. 2000) (illustrating how the school board did not meet with the
victim until her mother withdrew her from the school); James, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82199 *6 (explaining a student transferring after a school district took no action against
harassment); Brimfield Grade Sch., 552 F. Supp. 2d at 820 (noting parents decided for
their son to transfer after repeated attempts to have the school act); Bruning, 486 F.
Supp. 2d at 910-11 (detailing Bruning's transfer to an alternative school to escape the
harassment); Siewert v. Spencer-Owen Cmty. Sch. Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 942, 953
(S.D. Ind. 2007) (showing that victim transferred after two years of harassment that
was not addressed properly by the school system); Theno, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1309
(detailing how a student was unable to "laugh off' harassment and transferred schools).
181. See Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 444-45 (explaining how fellow
students would yell slurs at the victim from a blue truck).
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suicide. 18 2 In Doe v. Erskine College, the student was repeatedly harassed
by both the accused student and his friends to such an extent that she stated
that she was "referred to on campus as the 'rape girl.'" 183 The ongoing
trauma eventually led her to attempt suicide also, after which she was
diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and nearly involuntarily

institutionalized. 184 In Doe ex rel. Doe v. Coventry Board of Education, a
male student sexually assaulted a female student off school grounds and the
85
As a result, the
school took no disciplinary action against the assailant.'
school allowed him "to continue attending school with [plaintiff] for three
years after the assault, leaving constant potential for interactions between
the two," allowed the two students to share a lunch period and class for
over six months after the school was notified of the assault, and allowed the
assailant's "friends [to] verbally harass [and threaten] her in school, calling
her 'slut,' 'cow,' 'whore,' 'liar,' and 'bitch,"' and [sending] her a text
message stating, "'[Y]ou better watch your back if my boy goes to

jail.'").186
Furthermore, statements in these cases indicate court concerns that a
school's failure to respond properly to initial or repeated instances of
harassment can actually encourage harassers. To protect against this,
several courts have decided that, when schools are aware that a response
182. E. Haven Bd. of Educ., 430 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (showing the victim was subject
to more harassment after she submitted her complaint to the school).
183. See Doe v. Erskine Coll., No. 8:04-23001-RBH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35780,
at *22 (D.S.C. May 25, 2006).
184. See id. (noting victim suffered from being questioned continuously and wanted
to die from harassment).
185. See 630 F. Supp. 2d 226, 232 (D. Conn. 2009) (describing how the school
system allowed the assailant to attend school with the victim through graduation with
no disciplinary action).
186. Id. at 233; see also Terrell v. Del. State Univ., No. 09-464 (GMS), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 74841, at *3 (D. Del. July 23, 2010) (denying the school's motion to
dismiss because, when the plaintiff reported that another student assaulted and beat her,
the school permitted him to continue attending classes without restriction, "informed
[her] that she would be required to adjust her schedule and transfer out of [a shared]
class," and "punished [her] equally with her male assailant" by initiating disciplinay
proceedings against her, thus causing the plaintiff to miss a semester from school,
"because of her fear of the alleged male assailant's presence on campus, along with the
defendants' lack of action concerning her assault"); C.T. v. Liberal Sch. Dist., 562 F.
Supp. 2d 1324, 1336 (D. Kan. 2008) (denying summary judgment to a school where
the school did nothing to address harassment of a male student by peers who physically
assaulted him, threatened to kill him, "called him names such as 'fag boy' and said
things to him like 'I hear you are Johnny's little bitch' and 'I hear you got butt raped by
Johnny' because the victim had filed charges of molestation against a male school
volunteer who ran a weight-training program for students in his house); Jones v. Ind.
Area Sch. Dist., 397 F. Supp. 2d 628, 628 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (denying school's motion to
dismiss Title IX claims, without discussion, when a female student was raped by a
teacher, eventually reported the rape, and was subsequently subjected to student-onstudent harassment, including being called a "slut" and "whore," mocked for reporting
the rape, spit upon, pushed, and having the books knocked out of her hands, as well as
having teachers tell students that the victim was lying about the rape).
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method is not achieving the goal of stopping the harassment, those schools
may not continue using only that method. 18 7 Other cases have noted that
school inaction in one instance of violence is often followed by additional
violence, including violence that escalates in severity. In Derby, for
instance, in questioning why the school did not consider expelling the
assailant, the court notes that the assailant was later expelled after he
sexually assaulted a second student.'8 8 In Ray v. Antioch Unified School
District,the court accepted plaintiffs claim that, as a consequence of the
school's deliberate indifference to students' harassment of plaintiff for
plaintiffs perceived sexual orientation and his transgendered mother,
"Defendant Carr became emboldened, and assaulted and severely injured
Plaintiff while on his way home from school."189 In Siewert v. SpencerOwen Community School Corp., after the school's failure to respond to a
similar instance of escalating harassment, the Court went as far as to state
that "the students at OVMS who were bullying S.S. could have actually
construed the School Corporation's inaction as tacit approval of their
behavior, prompting them to engage in even greater acts of bullying."l 9 0
The concern that school responses to peer sexual violence may actually
encourage further violence is echoed by another line of Title IX cases in
which the facts indicate that a school's actions actually facilitated or made
women vulnerable to sexual violence. For instance, in Simpson v.
University of ColoradoBoulder, the plaintiffs alleged that the University of
Colorado (CU) "sanctioned, supported, [and] even funded"' 9 ' a football
recruiting program where the risk of peer sexual violence was so obviously
great that the school's failure to address it constituted deliberate
indifference.19 2 In denying the University's motion for summary judgment,
the Tenth Circuit found that the football coach "maintained an
unsupervised player-host program to show high-school recruits 'a good
187. See Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., No. 08-1008, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25, at
*32 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2009) (making a school system still responsible for indifference
even if some action was taken); Martin v. Swartz Creek Cmty. Sch., 419 F. Supp. 2d
967, 974 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (making school system's responsible for incidents
witnessed by faculty even if formal complaints were not submitted); Jones, 397 F.
Supp. 2d at 645 (showing the school system's non-reaction after the victim was
harassed); Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir. 2000)
(describing how when a school system realizes their system is inadequate, they are
responsible for remedying the procedure); S.S. v. Alexander, 177 P.3d 724, 739 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that the school continuing to use ineffective methods to
respond to the violence constitutes deliberate indifference).
188. See Doe v. Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d 438, 447-48 (D. Conn. 2006).
189. Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1168 (D. Cal. 2000).
190. Siewert v. Spencer-Owen Cmty. Sch. Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 942, 954 (S.D.
Ind. 2007).
191. Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1177 (10th Cir.
2007).
192. Id. at 1185.
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time' despite knowing generally "of the serious risk of sexual harassment
and assault during college-football recruiting efforts; . . . that such assaults

had indeed occurred during CU recruiting visits; . .. [and] that there had
been no change in atmosphere since" the last assault.193
Along the same lines, in Williams v. Board of Regents, the plaintiff was

gang-raped by three fellow students, the leader of whom was recruited by
the University of Georgia (UGA) basketball team and admitted to the
school even though UGA's coach, athletics director, and president had
knowledge that the student had criminal and disciplinary problemsincluding a history of sexually violent behavior-which resulted in his
dismissal from another school and plea of no contest to misdemeanor
criminal charges. 194 The Eleventh Circuit denied the school's motion to
dismiss because UGA's admission to having had this knowledge about the
student prior to admitting him, combined with taking eight months to
respond to Williams's report and the school's failure "to inform studentathletes about the applicable sexual harassment policy," could show that
the school was deliberately indifferent to the harassment.' 95 Finally, in JK.
v. Arizona Board of Regents, the court denied the university's summary

judgment motion when a student athlete in a "Summer Bridge Program"
designed to help high school students transition to college, was expelled for
sexual harassment and other misconduct.' 96 The court found evidence
indicating deliberate indifference in the university's re-admission of the
athlete to Arizona State University as a freshman, which put him in a
position to sexually assault the plaintiff.19 7
If this case law was not enough to encourage schools to take
responsibility for addressing gender-based violence between students, there
is an additional administrative enforcement regime for Title IX provided by
OCR.19 8 Both enforcement jurisdictions derive from the fact that schools
agree to comply with Title IX in order to receive federal funds,"' but the
OCR process is injunctive, so student victims complaining to OCR will not
get monetary damages. OCR enforcement generally takes place as a result
193. See id. at 1184.
194. Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007) (showing
that because the University of Georgia did little to prevent future attacks, the inaction
perpetuated deliberate indifference).
195. See id. (explaining how the University of Georgia exerted no control over the
situation where individuals were victims of harassment).
196. See J.K. v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, No. CV 06-916-PHX-MHM, 2008 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 83855 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2008).
197. See id. at *6.
198. See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 146, at i (regulating compliance standards
for sexual harassment).
199. See id. at 2-3 (explaining that compliance is mandatory to receive federal funds
from all categories of schools).
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of a complaint being filed regarding a school's response to a sexual
harassment case, which causes OCR to undertake a fairly comprehensive
investigation of that school's response system. 20 0 OCR cases are generally
resolved through a "letter of finding" (LOF) addressed to the school and
written by OCR, which is sometimes accompanied by a "commitment to
resolve" signed by the school. 201
Due to its injunctive nature, OCR can, and often will, require schools to
change their entire peer sexual violence and harassment response system,
including but not limited to policies, procedures, and resource allocations.
For the same reason, OCR's process uses a "knew or reasonably should
have known" standard when it conducts an investigation of a school's
compliance 2 02 because "OCR always provides the school with actual notice
and the opportunity to take appropriate corrective action before issuing a
finding of violation." 203 Thus, OCR has found Title IX violations when a
school's policies and procedures did not follow OCR's requirements.
Examples of this include when schools create fact-finding procedures and
hearings with significantly more procedural rights for the accused than the
survivor;204 adopt a standard of proof more exacting than "preponderance
of the evidence,"205 and do not provide clear time frames for prompt
200. See id. at 14 (illustrating the investigative process when an incident is reported).
322 (explaining the interview
201. See EDUCATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 150,
process and how the university must show that it did all it could to remedy the
situation).
202. See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 146, at 13.
203. Id. at iv.

204. See, e.g., Letter from Debbie Osgood, Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't
of Educ., to Rev. John I. Jenkins, President, Univ. of Notre Dame, available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/050720 11 -a.pdf (Jun. 30,
2011) [hereinafter Univ. Notre Dame Letter]; Letter from Catherine D. Criswell, Dir.,
Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Gloria Hage, General Counsel, E. Mich.
Univ., available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/
15096002-a.pdf (Nov. 22, 2010) [hereinafter E. Mich. Univ. Letter]; Letter from
Catherine D. Criswell, Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Dave L.
Armstrong, Vice President for Enrollment and Legal Counsel, Notre Dame Coll.,
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/15096001a.pdf (Sept. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Notre Dame Coll. Letter]; Letter from Myra
Coleman, Team Leader, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Valerie I.
available at
Univ.,
Temple
Counsel,
University
Esq.,
Harrison,
(June 4, 2007)
http://ncherm.org/documents/66-TempleUniversity-03062060.pdf
[hereinafter Temple Univ. Letter]; Letter from Gary D. Jackson, Reg'l Civil Rights
Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Jane Jervis, President, The
Evergreen State Coll., available at http://www.ncherm.org/documents/193EvergreenStateCollege10922064.pdf (Apr. 4, 1995) [hereinafter Evergreen State Coll.
Letter].
205. See, e.g., Univ. Notre Dame Letter, supra note 204, at 6 (noting that, although
the University stated that it used a preponderance of the evidence standard, it did not
notify students of this standard); Letter from Sheralyn Goldbecker, Team Leader,
Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to John J. DeGioia, President, Georgetown
Univ., available at http://www.ncherm.org/documents/199-GeorgetownUniversity11032017.pdf (May 5, 2004) (requiring a preponderance of evidence standard upon
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resolutions of complaints.206 Such violations constitute additions to the list
of institutional responses that have gotten schools in trouble in private
lawsuits, although the responses that qualify as deliberately indifferent in
private lawsuits also qualify as violations of Title IX under OCR
enforcement.20 7
investigation); Evergreen State Coll. Letter, supra note 204, at 8 (stating that the
evidentiary standard applied to Title IX actions is that of a "preponderance of the
evidence"); Letter from John E. Palomino, Reg'1 Civil Rights Dir., Office for Civil
Rights, U.S. De 't of Educ., to Ruben Armifiana, President, Sonoma State Univ. (Apr.
29, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Sonoma State Univ. Letter] (noting that a
"much different and lower standard [of proof] is required for proving a case of sexual
harassment, including assault, under Title IX" than for "a criminal charge alleging
sexual assault").
206. See, e.g., Univ. Notre Dame Letter, supra note 204, at 3; E. Mich. Univ. Letter,
supra note 204, at 3; Temple Univ. Letter, supra note 204, at 6-7; Letter from Howard
Kallem, Chief Attorney, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Stephen W.
Vescovo, Thomason, Hendrix, Harvey, Johnson & Mitchell, available at
http://ncherm.org/documents/80-ChristianBrothersUniversity-0403204 3 .pdf (March 26,
2004); Letter from John E. Palomino to Karl Pister (June 15, 1994), in Univ. of Cal.,
Santa Cruz, OCR Case No. 09-93-2141 (on file with author) [hereinafter Univ. of Cal.,
Santa Cruz Letter]; Sonoma State Univ. Letter, supra note 205, at 5.
207. For examples where the victim reported rape or harassment to a school official
or some other authority figure, but the school did nothing or failed to prevent the
offender or his friends from continually coming in contact with the victim, see, e.g.,
Letter from Debbie Osgood, Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to
Dennis Carlson, Superintendent, Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist., available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/05115901-a.pdf (Mar. 15,
2012); see also Univ. Notre Dame Letter, supra note 204, at 5-6; Letter from Zachary
Pelchat, Supervisory Attorney, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., and
Anurima Bhargava, Chief, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep't of Just., to Richard L.
Swanson, Superintendent, Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/09111031-a.pdf (June 29,
2011); Letter from Charlene F. Furr, Operations Officer, Office for Civil Rights, U.S.
Dep't of Educ., to Jimmy D. Hattabaugh, Superintendent, Mansfield Sch. Dist. (Apr.
16, 2007) (on file with author); Letter from Cathy H. Lewis, Acting Dir., Policy &
Enforcement Serv., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Thomas Crawford,
Superintendent, Acad. Sch. Dist. (Apr. 16, 1993) (on file with author).
For examples where the school delayed responding, see, e.g., Letter from Frankie Furr,
Team Leader, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to James E. Nelson,
Superintendent, Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. (Aug. 5, 2005) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. Letter]; Letter from Thomas J. Hibino, Reg'l
Civil Rights Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Daniel Kehoe,
Superintendent, Millis Pub. Sch. (May 19, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Millis Pub. Sch. Letter]; Letter from Charles R. Love, Program Manager, Office for
Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Glenn Roquemore, President, Irvine Valley Coll.
(Jan. 28, 2003) (on file with author).
For more details on cases in which the school conducted a biased investigation, see
Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. Letter, supra; Sonoma State Univ. Letter, supra note 205;
Univ. of Cal., Santa Cruz Letter, supra note 206.
Finally, for examples of cases where school officials investigated and determined that
the sexual violence did occur, but did not discipline or minimally disciplined the
assailant and did not protect the survivor from any retaliation, see Millis Pub. Sch.
Letter, supra; Sonoma State Univ. Letter, supra note 205; Letter from Patricia Shelton,
Branch Chief, and C. Mack Hall, Div. Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., to James C. Enochs, Superintendent, Modesto City Schs. (Dec. 10, 1993) (on
file with author); Letter from John E. Palomino, Reg'1 Civil Rights Dir., Office for
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Thus, Title IX jurisprudence in peer sexual violence cases puts an
emphasis on the role of the institution-the collective entity-in
addressing, or failing to address, the violence. In doing so, it focuses on
how the school's action or inaction when faced with reports of sexual
violence is linked to the actions of individual students, understanding that
the school's actions or inactions send a message to individual students.
These Title IX cases, moreover, are particularly concerned with how the
school's message translates into later student behavior. Title IX case law
particularly disapproves of school inaction-the most common of school
reactions to known instances of peer sexual violence-and makes it clear
that schools must at least investigate reports of such violence and seek to
prevent the reoccurrence of the violence and any harassment or retaliation
related to the violence. Courts generally do not engage in prescriptive
analyses that discuss specific methods by which schools should seek to
prevent future violence. Nevertheless, the cases cumulatively suggest that
failing to discipline-properly or at all-known perpetrators, displaying
anti-victim bias, minimizing the significance of the violence, etc., are all
frowned upon because of the role they play in not only failing to prevent
later violence, but in potentially encouraging that violence by giving "tacit
approval" to it that can lead perpetrators to become "emboldened" and to
continue-even potentially escalate-the violence.
III. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE "STATE RESPONSIBILITY" AND "SCHOOL
RESPONSIBILITY" THEORIES

As this review of both the theory of State responsibility in international
law and the theory of school responsibility under Title IX shows, there are
many similarities between these two theories, which can be broken down
into two general categories. In the first category are similarities related to
States' and schools' status as collective entities, most prominently the
concern with inaction by the collective entity and the consequences of that
inaction. In the second category are similarities related to both theories'
derivation from equal protection and anti-sex discrimination theories.
A. Inaction
The first set of similarities show the ways in which the State
responsibility and school responsibility theories both see States' and
schools' status as collective entities as empowering them not only to coerce
certain types of behavior from individual members of the collective, but
also to express what the collective community thinks is wrong or right

Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Robin Wilson, President, Cal. State Univ., Chico
(Oct. 23, 1991) (on file with author).
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about that behavior. As such, these theories treat inaction on the part of the
State or school as having particular power because of its force as a
normative statement. That is, even when a collective entity articulates rules
of behavior, if that entity takes no action to enforce such rules, it
undermines the message of those rules by implying that they are not
important enough for enforcement.
The concern with inaction and its effect on the normative message that
gender-based violence is a crime can be seen first in the similar use by both
theories of the concept of "environment." Indeed, what this Article terms
the "school responsibility theory" is more commonly known as a form of
hostile environment sexual harassment.208 As such, the concept of
environment is a central part of the theory, and captures the experience of
how this form of sexual harassment operates: as a form of harassment that
permeates the space in which the victim operates, whether it be school or
workplace. In fact, in the Title IX context, the legal standard used for
determining whether hostile environment sexual harassment exists is
whether the alleged harassing behavior is "so severe, pervasive and
objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim's access to an
educational opportunity or benefit." 209 As this standard has been applied,
moreover, pervasiveness is often the most critical part of the determination,
with severity substituting entirely for pervasiveness only in cases like
sexual violence,210 in which the severity of the trauma resulting from the
violence essentially makes the harassment a pervasive part of the victim's
life even if the violence itself has not been repeated.
This recognition of the environmental effects of trauma, widely
acknowledged as a common experience for most sexual violence victims,211
can be seen in court statements in Title IX cases finding that a school's
failure to separate victims and perpetrators qualifies as deliberate
indifference. The court in Doe v. Hamden Board of Education articulated
this premise most directly. In that case, when the school allowed both the
208. See Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
675 (1999) (describing hostile environment harassment at academic institutions).
209. See id. at 632.
210. See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 146, at 6 ("The more severe the conduct,
the less the need to show a repetitive series of incidents; this is particularly true if the
harassment is physical. For instance, if the conduct is more severe, e.g., attempts to
grab a female student's breasts or attempts to grab any student's genital area or
buttocks, it need not be as persistent to create a hostile environment. Indeed, a single
or isolated incident of sexual harassment may, if sufficiently severe, create a hostile
environment.").
211. See Nicole P. Yuan et al., The Psychological Consequences of Sexual Trauma,
NAT'L ONLINE RES. CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (Mar. 2006),
http://www.vawnet.org/applied-research-papers/print-document.php?doc
id=349
(reporting rates of PTSD among rape survivors vary from approximately 30% to 6 5 %
depending on how and when the PTSD symptoms are assessed).
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victim and attacker to attend the same school the semester following the
rape, the court stated that "[a] reasonable jury could conclude that Garcia's
presence at school throughout the school year was harassing to Mary Doe
because it exposed her to multiple encounters with him.
Further
encounters, of any sort, between a rape victim and her attacker could create
an environment sufficiently hostile to deprive the victim of access to
educational opportunities provided to her at school."212 Similarly, in
Derby, where the assailant was allowed to return to school after a brief 10day suspension, the court stated that "Sally Doe's affidavit states that she
saw Porto, Jr. many times during the school year and that the experience of
seeing him 'was very upsetting' and made the 'school year very hard.'
Thus, even absent active post-assault harassment by Porto, Jr., the fact that
he and the plaintiff attended school together could be found to constitute
pervasive, severe, and objectively offensive harassment." 2 13
The articulations of the State responsibility theory echo this concern
about environment. Each of the Inter-American opinions relating to
gender-based violence committed by non-State actors-Mariada Penha,
Cotton Field, and Lenahan-make references to an "environment of
impunity," 214 or "a climate that is conducive to domestic violence." 2 15 The
U.N. Secretary-General discusses how "[s]ocial norms ... [can] create an
environment that either condones or discourages violence" 2 16 and advises
States that, among the actions they need to take in meeting their
international obligations to combat violence against women, they must
prosecute perpetrators to "eliminat[e] any climate of impunity surrounding
such offences. ,,2 17 He further indicates that "[v]igorous arrest and
prosecution policies make a statement to society as a whole that violence
against women is a serious crime that is not condoned by the
authorities."218 However, because "the majority of reported cases of
violence against women are not prosecuted and of those that are, many do
not result in a conviction," 2 19 a message of tolerance for gender-based
violence is sent to society instead, subverting the significance of any
212. Doe v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., No. 3:06-cv-1680, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40269,

at *16-17 (D. Conn. May 19, 2008).

213. Doe v. Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d 438, 444 (D. Conn. 2006).
214. Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
80/11,
168 (2011); GonzAlez v. Mexico (In re Cotton Field), Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, 388
(Nov. 16, 2009).
215. Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
54/01, OEA/Ser.L.V.II.1 11 doc. 20 rev. 55-56 (2001).
216. SEC'Y-GEN. STUDY, supra note 122, at 35.
217. Id at 99.
218. Id. at 108.
219. Id
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normative anti-gender-based violence messages that might exist in that
society.
Moreover, both the State and school responsibility theories are
concerned not only with the normative message itself, but also with the
consequences of that message. Their concern with these environments of
impunity derives from these theories' view that such climates perpetuate
continued, future violence. As the opening quote from the Lenahan
opinion indicates, the Inter-American Commission's main concern
regarding State inaction is that the environment of impunity that it creates
"promotes the repetition of violence."22 o It sees inaction as serving "to
perpetuate the psychological, social, and historical roots and factors that
sustain and encourage violence against women," 22 1 to "propel[] the
repetition of the [violence],"222 to "promote[] the repetition of acts of
violence in general and [to] send[] a message that violence against women
is tolerated and accepted as part of daily life."223 The ECHR agreed when
it held that Turkey violated women's right to equal protection, stating that
"the general and discriminatory judicial passivity in Turkey created a
climate that was conducive to domestic violence."22 4 The SecretaryGeneral also concurs, stating, "Impunity for violence against women
compounds the effects of such violence[;] . . . [w]hen the State fails to hold

the perpetrators of violence accountable and society explicitly or tacitly
condones such violence, impunity . .. encourages further abuses." 22 5
Moreover, the facts of the cases from which the above statements come
seem to confirm the accuracy of this concern, as the abuse directed at the
victims in several of these cases not only continued, but escalated over
time, often culminating in murder or attempted murder. In Maria da
Penha, Brazil "condoned, for years during their marital cohabitation,
domestic violence perpetrated .. . by Marco Ant~nio Heredia Viveiros
against his wife at the time, . . . culminating in attempted murder and

further aggression in May and June 1983."226 In Opuz v. Turkey, from
1995 to 2001, authorities received five reports of assault and two reports of

220. See Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report

No. 80/11, 168 (2011).
221. Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
54/01, OEA/Ser.L.V.II.1 11 doc. 20 rev. 155-56 (2001).
222. Gonzalez v. Mexico (In re Cotton Field), Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, 1 155 (Nov.
16, 2009).
223. Id. 1388.
224. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 198 (2009), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-92945.
225. SEC'Y-GEN. STUDY, supra note 122, at 132.
226. Maria da Penha,Case 12.051, Report No. 54/01, 2.
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death threats before the applicant's abusive husband finally murdered her
mother.22 7 In Goekce v. Austria, the victim was murdered by her husband
after three years of escalating death threats and abuse.228 Finally, in Cotton
Field,the sheer number of murdered women-in the hundreds and possibly
thousands over a 12 year period-with bodies often showing evidence of
"extreme levels of violence, including sexual violence,"2 29 demonstrated
the consequences of Mexico's inaction.
Likewise, the facts and opinions in many Title IX school responsibility
cases reflect the insight that inaction leads to further-and often
escalated-violence. The cases where courts show the most concern-and
which have resulted in schools paying some of the largest settlements-are
ones in which the school's inaction leads to additional violence, escalation
of violence, retaliation, or further harassment against the same or other
victims. For instance, in Derby, the assailant was later expelled after he
sexually assaulted a second student. 230 In Ray, in light of the school's
inaction, the plaintiffs harasser "became emboldened, and assaulted and
severely injured Plaintiff while on his way home from school."23 1 In
Siewert, after the school's failure to respond to a similar state of escalating
harassment, the court saw the school's "inaction as tacit approval of [the
harassers'] behavior, prompting them to engage in even greater acts of
bullying."2 32 In Williams23 3 and JK.,234 where, according to publicly
available information, schools paid the second largest settlements in Title
IX's history, the schools knew of previous sexual violence committed by
the perpetrators who later assaulted the plaintiffs. In Simpson, the largest
Title IX settlement to date ($2.8 million), the Tenth Circuit found that the
227. See Opuz, App. No. 33401/02, TT 9-54 (outlining the events of harassment

leading to the death of the mother); see also Tomaiid v. Croatia, App. No. 46598/06,
Eur. Ct. H.R.
10 (2009), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=002-1695 (illustrating failed attempts by authorities to prevent the
harassment and killing of M.T. and her daughter); Kontrova v. Slovakia, App. No.
7510/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 14 (2007) (showing the murder of two children after the
applicant issued a complaint against her husband); Yildirim, supra note 40, 1 2.13
(showing how the victim was stabbed after many failed attempts by authorities to stop
the harasser).
228. See Goekce, supra note 39, IT 2.1-2.11 (showing how the victim was shot by
the father of their children when authorities did not respond to a call for help).
229. Gonzalez v. Mexico (In re Cotton Field), Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, 164 (Nov.
16, 2009).
230. See Doe v. Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d 438, 447-48 (D. Conn. 2006).
231. Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1168 (D. Cal. 2000).
232. Siewert v. Spencer-Owen Comty. Sch. Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 942, 954 (S.D.
Ind. 2007).
233. See Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007).
234. See J.K. v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, No. CV 06-916-PHX-MHM, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83855, at *13 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2008).
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university's actions actually facilitated the violence because it had
maintained a football player recruitment program where the university
knew sexual violence had occurred in the past and "there had been no
change in atmosphere since" the last assault.23 5
In the campus context, moreover, it is not only the court cases that
corroborate the State and school responsibility theories' concern with the
link between collective entity inaction and future violence. The theory is
also borne out by empirical studies that have been conducted regarding
sexual violence between peers on college campuses. These studies have
often been treated by the researchers themselves as relevant beyond the
college population.236
In the first set of such studies, criminologists have used the Routine
Activities Theory to posit that sexual violence occurs so much on college
campuses because there are a surfeit of "motivated offender[s] [and]
suitable target[s] and an absence of capable guardians all converg[ing] in
one time and space." 237 These studies suggest that all three elements must
be present for there to be a significant crime problem and that the failure of
schools to act as "capable guardians" 2 38 causes "motivated offenders" (i.e.,
235. Simpson v. Univ. of Colorado Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1184 (10th Cir. 2007).
236. For instance, one of the earliest studies on acquaintance sexual assault,

discussed in Robin Warshaw's I Never Called It Rape, was conducted on college

women and men subjects, but draws conclusions regarding men and women generally.
See, e.g., RoBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE 48 (1988) (using survey from

Ms. Magazine Campus Project on Sexual Assault, which questioned 3,187 female
college students from randomly selected classes at campuses that reflected a cross
section of regions and cultures to support the statement that sexual assault is a common
experience for women); see id. at 84 (using survey from Ms. Magazine Campus Project
on Sexual Assault, which questioned 2971 college men, to support that "men who
committed rape were more likely to believe rape-supportive myths"). More recently,

Lisak and Miller's Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending Among Undetected Rapists

used a study conducted on 1,882 students at a mid-sized, urban commuter university to
support the proposition that the majority of undetected rapists are repeat rapists,
without differentiating between college student undetected rapists and undetected
rapists in general. Lisak & Miller, supra note 135, at 72, 76, 80-81.
237. Amy I. Cass, Routine Activities and Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Individualand School-Level Factors,22.3 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMs 350, 351 (2007).
238. See Martin D. Schwartz et al., Male Peer Support and a Feminist Routine
Activities Theory: UnderstandingSexual Assault on the College Cam us, 18 JUsT.

Q.

623, 630 (2001) (describing how capable guardians can help deter harassment
situations); see also Elizabeth Ehrhardt Mustaine & Richard Tewksbury, Sexual
Assault of College Women: A Feminist Interpretationof a Routine Activities Analysis,

JusT. REV. 89, 101 (2002) (providing an explanation for the history and use
of the Routine Activities Theory in explanations of criminal violence generally and
sexual violence on college campuses specifically. The original theory focused almost
entirely on the victims as "suitable targets," and has been criticized for seeking to

27 CRIM.

"deflect[] attention away from offenders' motivation."); Schwartz et al., supra, at 625
(focusing on the "motivated offender" part of the equation, including proposing a
feminist version of Routine Activities Theory); see id at 628 (noting that the "absence
of capable guardians" aspect of the theory's equation is the least studied and
highlighting the effect that a rape-supportive culture has on all three parts of the
equation, in that it "gives men some of the social support they need ... to victimize
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college men) to be more influenced by peers who support assaults against
"suitable targets" (i.e., college women).239
In light of this theory, other studies can be viewed as elucidating
different parts of the "suitable target," "motivated offender," and
"incapable guardian" triangle. For instance, studies have focused on the
"suitable targets" when studying the high rate of victim non-reporting and
on "the motivated offenders" when studying the widespread presence of
sexual harassment- and rape-supportive attitudes among college students.
Such studies estimate that 90% or more of survivors of sexual assault on
college campuses do not report the assault,240 due to fear of hostile
treatment or disbelief by legal and medical authorities,241 not thinking a
crime had been committed or that the incidents were serious enough to
involve law enforcement, 2 42 not wanting family or others to know, 243 and
lack of proof.2 44 In addition, studies have confirmed wide subscription to
sexual violence-supportive attitudes among college men. For instance, a
2001 study found significant peer support for sexual violence among
college men. 245 A study in 1993 found that 5-8% of college men commit
rape knowing it is wrong; 10-15% of college men commit rape without
knowing that it is wrong; and 35% of college men indicated some
likelihood that they would rape if they could be assured of getting away
with it.2 46
A 1986 study whose subjects were overwhelmingly
women [while women's] internalization of [the same culture] can contribute both to the
availability of 'suitable targets' and to the lack of deterrence structures to act as
effective guardianship"); id. at 630.
239. See Schwartz et al., supra note 238, at 646 (assessing the gender of individuals
who are vulnerable to harassment).
240. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 130, at 24 (noting that victims of rape, sexual
coercion, and sexual contact with force had especially high levels of non-reporting,
between ninety-five and one hundred percent).
241. See id. at 23 (citing that some victims stated they did not report the abuse in
part because they believed the police would not want "to be bothered" with
investigating the incident); see also BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 130, at 13 (finding
that women may not desire to go through uncomfortable medical procedures associated
with reporting); WARSHAW, supra note 236, at 50 (noting that women may also try to
turn their experience of rape into an ongoing relationship to make it acceptable).
242. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 130, at 23 (noting that victims stated they did not
perceive the incidents of abuse to be important enough to notify the police).
243. See id. at 23-24 (noting that for incidents of completed rape, approximately
44% of victims stated they did not report the incident because they did not want their
family to know about the abuse).
244. See id. (stating that approximately 31% of victims of a threat of rape stated they
did not report the incident because they believed there was an absence of proof that the
incident occurred).
245. See Schwartz et al., supra note 238, at 641 (finding that data also suggested that
those who did not have friends who encouraged them to abuse women had very low
levels of admission to committing rape).
246. See BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 130, at 6-7, 21 (noting the study indicated
that 35% of males in fraternities forced another person to have sex).
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undergraduate men indicated that 30% of men say they would commit rape
and 50% would "force a woman into having sex" if they would not get
caught.247
In the area of male peer support for sexual violence, Professors Martin
D. Schwartz and Walter S. DeKeseredy have done a series of studies,
together or in conjunction with others, where they have examined the role
of such support in encouraging college men to perpetrate sexual violence.
In the most recent of those studies, they concluded that, "men who report
having [sexually aggressive friends] clearly report more sexually
aggressive behavior," 248 and that these "peers encourage [sexually abusive
male undergraduates] to assault their girlfriends or dating partners."249
Specifically, they found that male peer support for emotional, physical, or
sexual violence approximately doubled the chances for the man to commit
an act of sexual aggression.250 When the peer support was combined with
drinking alcohol two or more times a week, the likelihood that a man
would "force sexual activity on a dating partner" increased nearly ten-fold
over men who did not drink so frequently or did not have peers who
influenced them to be emotionally, physically, or sexually violent.251 In
contrast, "men who claim to have no friends advocating abuse of women
admit to relatively little abuse themselves." 252
247. See WARSHAW, supra note 236, at 97 (noting the increase in men who
responded affirmatively when the wording of the survey was changed from rape to
forcing a woman to have sex).
248. See Schwartz et al., supra note 238, at 642 (acknowledging that "[it is
impossible to discover whether the man's friends actually act in this manner, or

whether the man simply perceives that they do so"; but pointing out that this caveat
does not affect the analysis because the perception acts as a form of peer support).
249. See id. at 641 (noting that this relationship is moderately strong and that similar
findings have been made by other studies).

250. See id at 644 (finding that peer support for sexual violence increases these
odds by 2.4 times).
251. See id (finding that the perpetrator's consumption of alcohol had more of a
clear effect on the perpetration of sexual violence than the victim's consumption of
alcohol); see also id. at 638-39 (finding a "mostly linear relationship" between "men
who admit to engaging in sexually aggressive behavior" and men who "drink and use
drugs more often, but stating that "[t]he relationship for women is more complex"); see
also Michael A. Messner, The Triad of Violence in Men's Sports, in TRANSFORMING A
RAPE CULTURE 23, 38 (Emilie Buchwald et al. eds., revised ed. 2005) (positing that the
key role of heavy alcohol consumption in the male peer support group dynamic is again
largely about men's status and relationships with each other. It is simultaneously a
"part of the system of competitive status enhancement" and providing the "short term
benefit[]" of "loosen[ing] constraints on verbal and emotional expression" and making
"[t]he key desires underlying boys' and men's affiliations with each other-for
acceptance, emotional connection, respect-seem more accessible."); see also KIMMEL,
supra note 12, at 239 (noting speculation that "[d]rinking may be part of some men's
premeditated strategy to coerce women into unwanted sex or to be violent . .. [and
then] distance themselves from their violence").
252. See Schwartz et al., supra note 238, at 646-47 (noting that this study did not ask
about a perpetrator's number of friends who discouraged violence but that this would
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In addition, studies have shown that the vast majority of sexual
violence-and often other interpersonal violence as well-is committed by
a small number of repeat perpetrators. For example, a 2002 study surveyed
1882 male students at a university and found that 6.4% self-reported acts
qualified as rape or attempted rape.253 Of this group, 63.3% reported
committing repeat rapes, averaging about six rapes per perpetrator.25 4 In
addition, these "undetected" (i.e., not arrested or prosecuted) rapists each
committed an average of fourteen additional acts of interpersonal violence
(which includes battery, physical and/or sexual abuse of children, and
sexual assault short of rape or attempted rape). Thus, 4% of the students in
the study accounted for 28% of the violence, nearly ten times that of nonrapists (1.41 acts of violence per person) and 3.5 times that of single-act
rapists (3.98 acts of violence per person). 2 55 A more limited study in 1987
revealed that ninety-six college men accounted for 187 rapes.256
Thus, these studies cumulatively show a cycle whereby perpetrators'
willingness to commit sexual violence appears to increase if they believe it
is unlikely that they will get caught-a belief that is confirmed, according
to studies on repeat perpetration, when perpetrators are actually not caught.
Then, because survivors do not report the violence, perpetrators continue to
avoid getting caught, apparently continue to believe they will not get
caught, and continue to perpetrate.
Furthermore, because research
indicates that the main reasons campus sexual violence survivors do not
report is that they do not think anyone will believe them and that various
authorities, especially legal and medical authorities, will be hostile to them,
the nature of schools' responses to victims' reports can influence the rate of
victim reporting. 257 On the perpetrator's side, moreover, the school is
obviously in the best position to increase what these studies indicate has a
significant deterrent effect, i.e. getting caught, which contradicts
perceptions, apparently held by the small number of perpetrators, that they
can "get away with" committing violent acts. Unfortunately, the Routine
Activities Theory studies seem to suggest that schools' "incapable
guardian" behavior is having the exact opposite effect, and that schools'
inaction plays a critical role in perpetuating the cycle of non-reporting and
continued violence that fuels the peer gender-based violence problem.
The studies regarding the small number of repeat offenders, who other
"be a starting point for studying the nature of effective guardianship").
253. Lisak & Miller, supra note 135, at 78.
254. Id.
255. Id.

256. Schwartz et al.,supra note 238, at 12.
257. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 130, at 23-24 (noting that twenty-five percent of
victims in this survey stated they did not report an incident of rape to the police because
they feared the police would respond by treating them in a hostile manner).
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studies indicate are surrounded by peers who provide attitudinal support for
offending, also corroborate observations and analyses of the "silent
bystander" phenomenon as a factor in the perpetuation of sexual violence.
These analyses have come largely from sociologists and other social
scientists studying men and masculinity in the U.S., and they suggest that
male violence against women is supported by what Professor Michael
Kimmel has characterized as the "cultures of silence and protection." 258
Several of these analyses have used the infamous cases of the Glen Ridge
gang-rape, the Richmond gang-rape, and the Mepham hazing incident to
illustrate how these cultures operate. The Glen Ridge gang-rape was
perpetrated by a group of thirteen high school football players and wrestlers
who lured a "slightly retarded" 17-year-old girl into a basement, where four
raped her, three stayed and watched, and six left the basement without
intervening in the rape, reporting it, or agreeing to provide evidence in
subsequent litigation. 2 5 9 The Richmond gang rape was perpetrated against
a 15-year-old female student while about 20 male witnesses watched, some
laughing and taking photos, although some witnesses came forward later
and said they did not intervene because they feared retaliation for calling
the police and being viewed as a "snitch." 260 The Mepham hazing case
involved three players on the Mepham High School football team raping
three younger players with broomsticks, pinecones, and golf balls coated
with Mineral Ice, while other players watched.2 61
Various studies and analyses related to these cases and others like them
indicate that the cultures of silence and protection are maintained by a wide
258. See KIMMEL, supra note 12, at 227 (noting these cultures enable men to choose
to commit rape).
259. Messner, supra note 251, at 26.
260. See Stephanie Chen, Gang Rape Raises Questions About Bystanders' Role,
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-102009),
28,
(Oct.
CNN

28/justice/califomia.gang.rape.bystanderl bystander-crime-prevention-kittygenovese? s=PM:CRIME (noting that witnesses may fail to come forward for fear of
being seen as a snitch and for fear that the system will not protect them if they do);
Richmond Rape Witness Describes the Assault, ABC7 NEWS, KGO-TV SAN
FRANCIsCO,

CA

(Nov.

12,

2009),

http://abclocal.go.com/

kgo/story?section=news/local/east bay&id=7111732 (noting how witnesses laughed
and took photos of the rape; one witness came forward later and said he feared
retaliation for calling the police and being viewed as a "snitch."); Edecio Martinez,

While Dozens Gawked at Richmond Rape, One Brave Girl Called 911, CBS NEWS

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083 162-55350362009),
5,
(Nov.
504083.html?tag=contentMain%3bcontentBody (mentioning that the girl who called
the police stated that in this community in particular, snitching was looked down upon).
261. See Robert Kolker, Out of Bounds, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Oct. 27, 2003),
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/features/n 9391/ (citing the tension in the community
about whether this incident was one of haiing or sexual assault). Note that some cases
involving male victims, at least in school peer sexual violence cases, qualify as genderbased violence, a subject that is explored at length in my current work-in-progress
involving traditional masculinity, Title IX, and sexual harassment directed at boy
victims.
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range of actors, including not only teachers, coaches, and the rest of the
school administration, but also students, alumni, parents, and the larger
community. The six boys who left the scene at the Glen Ridge rape did
nothing to stop the boys who stayed, and they did not report the assaultindeed, all six "refused, during the subsequent long and painful years of
litigation, to turn on their male friends and provide incriminating
evidence." 26 2 The Richmond gang-rape was not reported until a woman
who was not present heard about the rape from her brother-in-law and
called the police.263
In the Mepham case, when the victims reported, other team members
refused to speak about what they had witnessed. The perpetrators were not
suspended until two weeks after the victims reported the abuse, and
students harassed the victims, calling them "fag" and "broomstick boy."2 6
Students protested when the perpetrators were eventually suspended, and
parents who spoke out on behalf of the victims at a school board meeting
received "identical profanity-laced letters in the mail, warning that if they
[kept] speaking out, they'[d] also get the broomstick treatment. 'Keep your
mouth shut,' the letters read, 'and nothing will happen to you or your
family."' 2 65 In addition, a previous case of senior players hazing a junior
player had been reported eight years before and, when the same coaches
did nothing, it resulted in a lawsuit that was later settled.266 That student
also received threatening letters and pointed to retaliatory behavior by the
coach, including benching the student for two years and physically
attacking him when he came back to play in the third year.267
Professor Kimmel and other experts on masculinity have concluded that
the cultures of silence and protection happen because of hierarchies among
the men and boys involved.268 As Professor Christopher N. Kendall
262. Messner, supra note 251, at 27.
263. See Martinez, supra note 260 (noting that the woman who came forward stated
that when her brother informed her of the incident, he said he did not know what to do
and that he was scared).
264. See Kolker, supra note 261 (noting also that initially the superintendent tried to
limit the inquiries about the abuse, told police that he would not provide information
about the students without a subpoena, and did not suspend any of the alleged
perpetrators from the school).
265. See id. (noting that even after the student protests, the school held its prep rally,
which was seen by many as a sign of support for the head coach, as well as the
suspended football players).
266. See History of Violent Hazing at LI. High School, ABC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2003),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90243&page=1 (noting that, in that incident, the
student was physically assaulted in the locker room when his teammates tried to push
his head into a urine-filled toilet).
267. See Kolker, supra note 261 (noting that the same head coach physically lunged
at the player and reached for his throat).
268. See KIMMEL, supra note 12, at 4-5 (explaining that while young men "remain
fixated on the trappings of boyhood. . . the boys ... struggle heroically to prove that
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explains, "men ... have two options: be violent and aggressive, hence
masculine and in control, or be the person upon whom that power is
exercised sexually." 26 9 In other words, most boys and men become silent
bystanders not because they support the behavior, but because the
denigration of girls and feminized boys through harassment and violence
generally establishes or maintains the perpetrators' status at the top of the
hierarchy. Challenging the perpetrators therefore threatens a loss of
masculine status for the bystander. To make it even more risky, that loss of
masculine status could itself open the bystander up to becoming a victim of
harassment and violence himself. This risk not only leads to the
widespread silent bystander phenomenon, but could also influence both
perpetrators and bystanders to be more tolerant of gender-based violenceor even see it as an acceptable form of sexual expression. Under such a
cultural norm, Professor Kendall continues, "if [men] want to retain the
privilege that attaches to those who are male, they must reject any form of
sexual expression that is nonhierarchical, non-abusive, non-alienating, read
equal." 270
Furthermore, Professors Schwartz and DeKeseredy note the interaction
between these cultures and the institution's absence of "capable
guardianship." 2 71 The 2001 study that they conducted regarding male peer
support for sexual violence indicates that, in light of the lack of strong antiviolence messages from campus authority figures, male peer support for
sexual violence likely encourages some men to perpetrate who might not
otherwise do so. 27 2 In discussing the "incapable guardian" prong of the
Routine Activities Theory formula, they come to a conclusion that is
certainly borne out by the Title IX case law discussed above: "college
Many campus
campuses too often are 'effective-guardian-absent.'
administrators do not seriously punish men who sexually abuse women,
even if they engage in extremely brutal behavior such as gang rape. Even
criminal justice personnel often disregard acquaintance and/or date rapes,
essentially telling men that their sexually aggressive behavior is

they are real men").
269. Christopher N. Kendall, Gay Male Liberation Post Oncale: Since When Is
Sexualized Violence Our Path to Liberation?, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT
LAW 221 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).

270. Id.
271. See Schwartz et al., supra note 238, at 625-27, 630 (noting that college
campuses are places particularly deficient in effective guardianship since the

administrators often do not seriously punish male perpetrators who assault women, thus
essentially sending a message to these perpetrators that their sexual assaults are
acceptable).
272. See id at 630, 641 (finding that even when brutal rapes occur, a large number
of campus administrators fail to effectively punish male perpetrators).
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acceptable."2 73 In this climate, the role of male peers may actually
substitute for proper guardianship:
[M]ale peer support can be regarded as a component of effective
guardianship. When offenders receive either encouragement or no
punishment from peers, administrators, faculty, and law enforcement
officials, then effective guardianship is lacking. On the other hand,
insofar as a man's friends give no support for abuse, this absence of
support may well be the beginning of effective guardianship. 274
In other words, the school itself becomes a silent bystander and its
bystander behavior interacts with other, individual bystanders. In addition,
its particular power as a bystander is acknowledged by the fact that the
support (or lack thereof) of the individual bystanders becomes a significant
factor only when the school is itself engaging in bystander behavior.
Moreover, given the way in which masculinities scholars suggest the
bystander phenomenon is created and perpetuated, it is worth noting that
the school has no excuse for being a silent bystander since it is not a person
susceptible to being victimized for breaking the code of silence.
In sum, the State responsibility cases before various international
tribunals, the Title IX school responsibility case law, and the empirical
research on incapable guardians and silent bystanders collectively support
the similar insights of the State and school responsibility theories as to the
link between inaction by collective entities and the perpetuation of
violence. Together, these three sets of evidence show that these theories'
common normative concern about "hostile environments" or
"environments of impunity" are confirmed by the real, and too often
devastating, consequences of such environments.
B. Equal Protection
The evidence of the practical consequences of collective entity inaction

also confirms the widely held conclusion that gender-based violence is both
a cause and a consequence of gender inequality. As the United Nations
Secretary-General stated:
Impunity for violence against women compounds the effects of such
violence as a mechanism of male control over women. When the State
fails to hold the perpetrators of violence accountable and society
explicitly or tacitly condones such violence, impunity not only
encourages further abuses, it also gives the message that male violence
against women is acceptable or normal. The result of such impunity is
not solely the denial of justice to the individual victims/survivors, but

273. Id. at 630 (citations omitted) (noting that these factors can reinforce an
environment wherein female victims are trained to blame themselves for rape).
274. Id. at 646 (citations omitted).
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also the reinforcement of prevailing gender relations and replication of
inequalities that affect other women and girls as well. 275
Because "violence against women is not the result of random, individual
acts of misconduct, but rather is deeply rooted in structural relationships of
inequality between women and men," 276 the report also states that "[i]t can
only be eliminated ... by addressing discrimination, promoting women's
equality and empowerment, and ensuring that women's human rights are

fulfilled."2 77
Given this conception of the overlap between gender-based violence and
gender discrimination, it is not surprising that both the State and school
responsibility theories derive from feminist legal theories regarding equal
protection and gender discrimination. As noted above, women's rights
activists and scholars combined Velcisquez's due diligence concept with
prohibitions on sex discrimination and guarantees of equal protection in
order to allow existing laws to reach gender-based violence. 27 8 Similarly,
sexual harassment was a "centuries old" 27 9 "social practice"2 80 that
Catharine MacKinnon and others theorized-or "talk[ed] about" in "new
ways"-that "enabled its re-characterization as unlawful conduct," 28 1
specifically as unlawful sex discrimination. The fact that both of these
theoretical projects derived in large part from the determination of feminist
activists to use the law to advance a political agenda of equality adds to the
power of these theories, because they are based in women's real world
experiences of gender discrimination. Moreover, because both theories are
concerned with entrenched, real world experiences of discrimination-with
"centuries-old social practices"-their ultimate goal is prevention and
compensation-oriented, with prevention seeking to end discrimination as a
part of achieving equality in the long-term, and compensation seeking to
lessen the inequalities resulting from the discrimination in the short term.
Thus, at the more detailed, doctrinal level, both of these theories have
developed similar mechanisms for achieving these prevention and
compensation goals. Specifically, the courts and tribunals deciding specific
cases utilizing the State and school responsibility theories have often
adopted standards and rules designed to encourage victims to come forward
and report to those in an official capacity, including by (1) crafting broad-

275.
276.
277.
278.

SEC'Y-GEN. STUDY, supra note 122, at 132.

Id. at ii.
Id. at i.
See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.

279. Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in
supra note 269, at 3.

DIRECTIONS INSEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW,

280. Id. at 1.
281. Id. at 8.
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based standards regarding when a collective entity has sufficient
knowledge of violence to respond to it, (2) providing mechanisms for
compensation of victims, and (3) requiring that States and schools protect
victims from retaliation for reporting, institute "interim measures" to
address victims' immediate needs resulting from the violence, and avoid
delay in responding to a report. The first on this list is oriented towards
primary prevention because knowledge standards can create incentives for
collective entities to take steps to stop the violence before it starts. The
others fit into the category of secondary or tertiary prevention, because they
take place after a certain amount of violence has already occurred but seek
to prevent further violence. Providing mechanisms for victims to receive
compensation can be considered secondary prevention but is also its own
independent goal.
With regard to knowledge standards, various international tribunals have
adopted a constructive knowledge standard in State responsibility cases.
Under this standard, States can be held responsible for violence committed
by non-State actors when the State "knew or should have known" prior to
the violent incident that there was a risk of violence, and yet did not act on
that knowledge.28 2 Therefore, in Lenahan, the Commission noted that "the
issuance of [a] restraining order and its terms reflect that the judicial
authorities knew that Jessica Lenahan and her daughters were at risk of
harm by Simon Gonzales .... [This order] is a key component in
determining whether the State authorities should have known that the
victims were in a situation of imminent risk of domestic violence upon
breach of the terms of the order."28 3 The Commission also discusses the
similar constructive knowledge standards used by the European Court of
Human Rights, the CEDAW committee, and by its own previous
decisions. 284
282. See Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 80/11, 133 (2011).
283. Id. % 141, 143.
132-35 (noting that the CEDAW committee has held States
284. See id.
responsible for not protecting victims, especially where the State had previously known
of the risk and failed to provide any protection). For more on the CEDAW and ECHR
cases, see Hajduovd v. Slovakia, App. No. 2660/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 50 (2010),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-101945
available at
(finding that a District Court assessment that the perpetrator had a history of criminal
actions and was in need of psychiatric treatment constituted constructive knowledge);
129, 133-36, available 2 at
Opuz v. Turkey, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R.
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/minjust/mju29/CASE%200F%200PUZ% 0
v[1].%20TURKEY.pdf (finding constructive knowledge where State officials were
aware that the applicant and her mother had repeatedly been severely assaulted by the
applicant's husband, despite the fact that they had withdrawn their complaints);
51-53, available at
Tomai6 v. Croatia, 2009-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
http://sljeme.usud.hr/usud/prakESen.nsf/Praksa/DE6EF404943E5FB2C125758200702
071?OpenDocument (holding that previous imprisonment for threats against the
victims was evidence that the authonties knew the threats were serious); Kontrova v.
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In the school responsibility cases, the standard adopted by courts is an
actual knowledge standard, which does not include the "should have
known" part of the constructive knowledge test. 28 5 This more narrow
knowledge standard has been consistently criticized since it was adopted,
including by some U.S. Supreme Court Justices.2 86
Much of the criticism of the actual knowledge standard derives from the
concern that it sets up the wrong incentives for schools-in that it
encourages schools to avoid knowledge, both generally and with regard to
specific cases, and therefore creates disincentives for schools to engage in
prevention efforts. 287 That is, when schools may be held responsible for
not preventing violence when they "should have known" of the risk of that
violence, they have a reason to minimize the chances that violence will
occur at all, which in turn creates incentives to engage in primary
prevention. When they can be held liable only if they "knew" about the
risk of violence, they have an incentive to lessen the likelihood that they
might learn of something to which they would be legally obligated to
respond. This creates disincentives to engage in any primary prevention
methods likely to increase reporting.
Nevertheless, OCR does use a constructive knowledge standard and has
done so consistently.28 8 Therefore, although a constructive knowledge
Slovakia,

2007-IV

Eur.

Ct.

H.R.

50-54,

available

at

http://www.coe.int/t/dg2/equality/domesticviolencecampaign/resources/Kontrova%20v
.%20Slovakia en.asp (repeating that the constructive knowledge standard should not
be applied in every situation where a risk was present, yet finding that police had

constructive knowledge in part because one officer helped amend a complaint against
the perpetrator so that no further action on a criminal offense was necessary); Goekce,
supra note 39, 12.1.4 (finding that the police should have responded to Goekce's call
as an emergency, given evidence of Mustafa Goekce's history of violence as a
criminal); Yildirim, supra note 40, 12.1.4 (finding that Austrian authorities should
have arrested Irfan Yildirim given their constructive knowledge that he presented a
great danger to Fatma Yildirim).
285. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998) (holding
that a school may be found liable under Title IX when "an official of the school district
who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective measures on the district's behalf
has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher's misconduct").
286. See id. at 293, 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the actual knowledge
standard encourages schools to avoid knowledge rather than set up procedures by
which survivors can easily report); see also Megan Ryan ed., Commentary, Comments
from the Spring 2007 HarvardJournalof Law & Gender Conference Held at Harvard
Law School, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 378, 386-87 (2008) (citing Linda Wharton, who

notes that the standard from Gebser did not comport with the standard applicable under
Title VII, inflicted too great a burden on victims, and created a danger that this standard
would be applied in ways that precluded liability except in extreme cases).

287. See generally Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads in the Sand: Lack of
Knowledge, Knowledge Avoidance, and the PersistentProblem of Campus Peer Sexual
Violence, 43 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 205, 223, 232-40 (2011) (noting that if schools do not

establish procedures that encourage survivors to report incidents, they can avoid
knowledge, and outlining more details on the actual knowledge problem).
288. See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 146, at 13 (stating that a "school has notice
if a responsible employee 'knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
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standard would create greater liability (and therefore be more powerful) if
it was sufficient to prove violation of Title IX in private lawsuits, OCR's
use of the constructive knowledge standard in the school responsibility
context helps to somewhat ameliorate the disincentives engendered by the
actual knowledge standard. It also indicates that there is some overlap,
although not a total one, between the school and State responsibility
approaches with regard to knowledge standards.
With regard to secondary prevention-oriented doctrines, there is greater
overlap between the deliberate indifference standard used in school
responsibility cases and standards developed by international tribunals.
First, both theories provide a mechanism for victim compensation-the
school responsibility cases by allowing private lawsuits for monetary
damages in Title IX cases,2 89 and the State responsibility decisions
290
awarding damages or recommending compensation.
Second, both theories require State and school collective entities to take
various measures that cumulatively make it more likely that victims will
report, that protect them if they do report, and that are more likely to hold
perpetrators accountable for violent acts, all of which have an underlying
purpose of preventing future violence by breaking the cycle of victim nonreporting and continued violence. These methods accept that holding
perpetrators accountable requires encouraging victims to report, so they
seek to address victims' reasons for not reporting (as documented by the
sociological studies reviewed above)-particularly perceptions that various
authorities will treat victims hostilely instead of protecting them. In
addition, these methods show an awareness, also supported by empirical
evidence, that deterring perpetrators from perpetrating requires changing
their perception that they will not "get caught" or face meaningful
consequences. Thus, the emphases of these collective entity responsibility
theories on perpetrator accountability, and victim reporting and protection
lead to very similar doctrinal mechanisms.
As an initial matter, both courts and tribunals reviewing collective entity
actions under the State and school responsibility theories make clear that

known,' about the harassment").
289. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979); see also Franklin
v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 73 (1992).
290. See, e.g., V.K., supra note 41,
9.15-9.16 (noting that the State should
provide sufficient compensation to correspond to the her rights violations); Lenahan v.
United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, 215 (2011)
(holding that the State needed to provide full compensation to Jessica Lenahan and her
relatives); Bevacqua v. Bulgaria, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 101, available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/research/bulgaria/BEVACQUA.pdf (holding that the
State had to provide the applicants with monetary redress within three months of the
case's final judgment); see also Rec (2002)5, supra note 81, 36 (noting that member
states should ensure that victims receive compensation, including for legal costs).
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they are not substituting themselves for the fact-finders involved in the
case. 2 9 1 Rather, they review the responses of the collective entity to the
violence, as is acknowledged by the general Title IX rule that schools are
not held responsible for the violence itself.2 9 2 Nevertheless, they can and
do look closely at those responses and their effectiveness, including
looking at elements such as whether the collective entity initiated an
investigation, how they conducted that investigation, whether they had
available and used "interim measures" to protect the victim once she
reported (including protection from retaliation), whether such steps were
taken quickly and avoided delay, and whether some disciplinary action or
sanctions were levied against the perpetrator.
Beginning with investigations, both international tribunals and U.S.
courts have made clear that in gender-based violence cases implicating
State and school responsibilities, collective entities have an obligation to at
least investigate.2 93 Moreover, those investigations must meet certain
minimal requirements, like conducting credibility assessments when faced
with competing factual accounts and not judging credibility based on
stereotypes about women or gender-based violence victims. 2 94 While the
291. See, e.g., Kalucza v. Hungary, App. No. 57693/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. T 63 (2012),
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110452
available
(stressing that the Court's "task is not to take the place of the competent Hungarian
authorities in determining the most appropriate methods of protecting individuals from
attacks on their personal integrity, but rather to review under the Convention the
decisions that those authorities have taken in the exercise of their power of

appreciation"); see also V.K., supra note 41,

9.6 (finding the Committee should not

review the facts or evidence of a case unless they appear arbitrary or discriminatory).
292. See, e.g., Doe v. Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d 438, 445-46 (D. Conn.
2006) (finding that since the Board could not be liable for the assault, it could only be
liable for the situation in the school after the assault); S.S. v. Alexander, 177 P.3d 724,
738 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that when notice is provided regarding the
harassment, the analysis of the adequacy of a school's response commences).
293. See, e.g., Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir.
2000) (noting that the school's response of having the victim complete her studies at
home rather than conducting an investigation was inadequate); Opuz v. Turkey, 2009-

III

Eur.

Ct.

H.R.

169,

available

at

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/

standardsetting/minjust/mju29/CASE%200F%200PUZ%20v[ 1].%20TURKEY.pdf

(finding that local authorities did not display the necessary diligence in investigating
and preventing the assault of the applicant); M.C. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 39272/98, Eur.

Ct.

H.R.

T 151

(2003),

available at

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/

47bl9f492.html (finding that Article 3 of the Convention creates an obligation for an
official investigation to be conducted); Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, $
181, 184 (noting that the United States has a duty to conduct an investigation of this
case and that this investigation must be impartial and serious to ensure the truth of the
facts); Gonzdlez v. Mexico (In re Cotton Field), Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, T 289 (Nov.
16, 2009) (noting that the State's investigation must be diligent to avoid liability).
294. See, e.g., S.S., 177 P.3d at 740 (finding that the school's "allowing [S.S.'s]
rapist's denial of wrongdoing to be accepted at face value" indicated deliberate
177 (finding the
indifference on the part of the school); MC, App. No. 39272/98,
disregard by the prosecutors in failing to test the credibility of two conflicting
witnesses' testimonies was inadequate); Vertido, supra note 42, T 8.5 (stating that the
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investigation is going on, or once a report is made, the entity should both
have available and actually use interim measures to protect the victim, 295
including protecting the victim from retaliation for reporting.296
Once the case proceeds to the point of adjudication, U.S. administrative
enforcement of Title IX and international tribunals have also developed
similar requirements for the procedural rights of victims and alleged
perpetrators (i.e., that they should be more equal than they are in the U.S.
criminal system), 297 including by adopting less onerous standards of proof
than "beyond a reasonable doubt." 298 Finally, both forms of U.S. Title IX
enforcement, as well as the international tribunals discussed here, frown

State's court's "judgment [showed] that the assessment of the credibility of the

[victim's] version of events was influenced by a number of stereotypes").
295. See, e.g., Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights, 315 F.3d 817, 824 (7th
Cir. 2003) (noting various measures taken by the school to separate the harasser and
victim and to discipline the harassing student); A. v. Croatia, App. No. 55164/08, Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1 47 (2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-101 152 (finding that these provisions may include implementing a
protocol for social and medical services); Opuz, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 82 (finding
that States should enact measures allowing the judiciary to implement measures that
protect victims during the litigation); Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, 177
(finding restraining orders to be adequate interim measures); Maria da Penha v. Brazil,
Case 12.051, Inter. Am. Comm'n H.R. Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L.V.II.111 doc. 20
rev.
3, 54 (2001) (noting these measures may include implementing legal redress
preventing the perpetrator from intimidating the woman); V.K., supra note 41, 5.1
(requiring that interim measures be appropriate and concrete); A.T., supra note 38,
9.5 (noting the lack of adequate interim measures enacted by the State).
296. See, e.g., Doe v. E. Haven Bd. of Educ., 430 F. Supp. 2d 54, 60 (D. Conn.
2006), aff'd, 200 F. App'x 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the plaintiff "was subject
to nearly constant peer harassment upon reporting that she had been sexually assaulted
173 (mentioning the
by two upperclassmen"); Opuz, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R.
authorities continued inaction despite the perpetrator's threats against the applicant
after he was released from prison, which the applicant reported); A.T., supra note 38,
8.4 (finding a three year delay between the incidents and the proceedings was
inappropriate, "particularly considering that the author has been at risk of irreparable
harm and threats to her life during that period"); see also Rec (2002)5, supra note 81,
44 (directing States to take "measures ... to protect victims effectively against threats
and possible acts of revenge").
297. See, e.g., Univ. Notre Dame Letter, supra note 204 (finding judicial
proceedings that allow for the associate dean to dismiss the charges if he believes they
lack merit are inadequate under Title IX's requirements); see also Opuz, 2009-III Eur.
Ct. H.R. T 147 (finding that in these cases perpetrators' rights should not overwhelm
the victims' right to mental and physical integrity); A.T., supra note 38,1 9.3
("Women's human rights to life and to physical and mental integrity cannot be
superseded by other rights, including the right to property and the right to privacy.");
Rec (2002)5, supra note 81, 38 (advising states to "ensure that all victims of violence
are able to institute judicial proceedings").
298. See, e.g., Evergreen State Coll. Letter, supra note 204 (noting that the clear and
convincing evidence standard of proof used by the school was higher than Title IX's
requirement of a preponderance of the evidence); see also Opuz, 2009-IlI Eur. Ct. H.R.
147 (noting that the State's argument that there was no tangible evidence of apparent
danger to the applicant's mother was an insufficient standard); V.K., supra note 41, TT
9.9, 9.16 (noting that, in this case, a beyond a reasonable doubt standard was applied,
which did not correspond with anti-discrimination standards).

2012]

COLLECTIVE ENTITY RESPONSIBILITY

285

upon failures to hold perpetrators accountable,2 99 and all stress the
importance of avoiding delay in arrest, adjudication, or the issuing of
protective orders.30 0
Thus, both the history and the current doctrinal approaches of the State
and school responsibility theories contain similarities that derive from these
theories' basis in feminist legal theories regarding equal protection and
gender discrimination. Accordingly, these theories share an understanding
of gender-based violence as a form of gender discrimination and as a cause
Therefore, they view the
and consequence of gender inequality.
elimination of gender-based violence as part of the greater goal of
achieving gender equality, and they agree on a very practical, doctrinal
level on what kinds of specific legal rules and standards will help prevent
such violence. Those prevention methods. include creating doctrinal
measures to give victims incentives to report and to eliminate barriers to
victim reporting by protecting them from retaliation, avoiding delay, and
providing access to resources most easily provided by collective entities,
such as "interim measure" protection and compensation if and when a
victim comes forward. These methods also include adopting knowledge
standards that encourage collective entities to engage in primary prevention
of gender-based violence.
299. See, e.g., Babler v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, Case 2:10-cv-01459-RRB (D. Ariz.
Feb. 15, 2010) (order denying school's motion to dismiss plaintiffs claims that the
school had ignored a five-year pattern of misconduct by the fraternity, she was
subsequently drugged and anally raped by fraternity member(s) and the school
obstructed the collection of evidence following her rape and failed to investigate
because she was "drunk" at the fraternity party); Hajduovd v. Slovakia, App. No.
50 (2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/
2660/03, Eur. Ct. H.R.
eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-101945 (finding that though police intervention was
commendable, their later failure to detain the perpetrator for psychiatric treatment was
inadequate); Gonzdlez v. Mexico (In re Cotton Field), Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, 388 (Nov.
16, 2009) (finding that prior judicial ineffectiveness in the case cultivated an
environment that was sympathetic towards continued acts of violence); Yildirim, supra
note 40, T 12.1.2 (finding that a comprehensive system to address domestic violence
including remedies is insufficient if not supported by actors who implement these
requirements with due diligence).
300. See, e.g., Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007)
(finding the school took eight months to respond to reports of a gang rape); Kalucza v.
64 (2012), available at
Hungary, App. No. 57693/10, Eur. Ct. H.R.
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-110452 (finding it "striking
that the authorities needed more than one and a half years to decide on the applicant's
first request for a restraining order"); In re Cotton Field,Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 205, 284 (finding that by failing to act with diligence right after the reports were
filed, the State lost important time); Maria da Penha, Case 12.051, Report No. 54/01
T 32 (finding that an unwarranted delay could have interfered with the statute of
limitations); Vertido, supra note 42, 8.3 (noting that claims should be dealt with in an
expeditious fashion); see also Rec (2002)5, supra note 81, TT 23, 29, 35 (noting that
victims should receive immediate assistance including medical treatment, should have
their complaints dealt with quickly by police, and should be assured of swift action by
the State against their perpetrators).
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CONCLUSION

As the first case to apply to the United States the decades-old
international law theory that States have a responsibility to act with due
diligence to prevent, investigate, punish, and provide compensation for
gender-based violence committed by non-State actors, Jessica Lenahan
(Gonzales) v. United States seems at first to conflict with U.S. law.
Moreover, the United States rejects the idea that it is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights because
the United States is a party only to the non-binding American Declaration
30
which the United States views as not
on the Rights and Duties of Man,o
setting out "an affirmative duty on States to actually prevent the
commission of individual crimes by private parties," 302 and generally
protests as a source of any mandatory authority by the Inter-American
These factors seem to
Commission and Court over the United States.
indicate that the case has little relevance within the United States and
"domesticating" it into U.S. law will be a difficult, if not impossible task.
However, conceiving of the State as a collective entity and comparing
Lenahan's "State responsibility" theory with another "collective entity
responsibility" theory, hostile environment sexual harassment, particularly
as it is used to regulate schools, demonstrates that Lenahan is not
antithetical to U.S. domestic law or to U.S. legal commitments to human
rights and equal protection. Its many similarities with the enforcement of
Title IX in hostile environment sexual harassment cases demonstrates that
the United States recognizes and uses tenets and doctrines in its regulation
of schools as collective entities that are very similar to the State
responsibility theory's regulation of State collective entities. This "school
responsibility" theory shares with the State responsibility theory concerns
about collective entity inaction and how that inaction fails to prevent and
301. See FAQ's on Human Rights: 6) How Do A Deceleration,A Convention And A
Covenant Differ from One Another?, UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND,
http://www.unfpa.org/derechos/preguntas eng.htm#faq6 (last visited September 24,

2012) (noting generally that though "a declaration is a series of norms and principles

drafted by States by and which they pledge to abide by," there is "no forceful
component to a declaration," and "those States who do not observe those norms and

principles are subject to 'moral sanctions' before the international community (i.e., The
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man)").
302. Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
80/11, T 106 (2011).
303. See Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights
(Art. 64 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 10, 12 (July 14, 1989) (stating that the United States
Government views The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man as "a
declaration of basic moral principles and broad political commitments and as a basis to
review the general human rights performance of member states, not as a binding set of
obligations").
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perpetuates gender-based violence. In addition, both theories derive their
doctrinal approaches from equal protection law and a goal to end genderbased violence as a cause and consequence of gender inequality. As a
result, these doctrines are similarly designed to prevent violence and
compensate victims as opposed to punish perpetrators, except to the extent
that punishment can help achieve the prevention and compensation goals.
Finally, both the theories' general focus on collective entity inaction and
their specific doctrinal approaches are borne out by empirical, sociological
research regarding the dynamics of gender-based violence-particularly the
role of silent bystanders and collective entities as the most powerful of
those bystanders. These various similarities show not only that Lenahan
does not oppose U.S. law, but also that Lenahan and U.S. law share
common values, goals, and methods to reach those goals.
Moreover, the analogy between these two theories has the potential to
help us recognize and create other forms of collective entity responsibility
theory in other legal regimes. The larger project for which this article is a
first step will turn to precisely this task by considering collective entity
responsibility concepts in separate follow-on articles examining the U.S.
tort and criminal justice systems. As we increase our understanding of the
insights that these theories hold regarding the normative and practical
consequences of discriminatory inaction by collective entities, they can
help us design and utilize legal methods more likely to reach the ultimate
goal: ending gender-based violence and eliminating it as a significant
barrier to gender equality. Doing so has the potential not only to achieve
gender equality, but to expand equal protection generally.

